

Civil-Military Relations and Democracy:  
The Role of the Military in the Polity

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## INTRODUCTION

To examine the role of the military in the polity, I will contrast the position of the Brazilian military viz-à-viz its national polity in that country's 1967-1985 authoritarian regime with the position of their counterparts in the three other bureaucratic authoritarian (BA) regimes: those of Argentina, 1976-1983; of Uruguay, 1973-1985; and of the still surviving BA in Chile that began in 1973.

I realize that the question of whether democracy is consolidated in Brazil depends upon numerous questions, such as the strengthening of political parties, the world debt crisis, and many questions that remain unanswered about the ability of democratic politicians to effectively build support for democracy by substantive changes. Certainly, the New Republic is beginning its life under the compounded hardships of extremely difficult economic conditions and the tragedy of the loss of its most unifying symbol, Tancredo Neves.

We also know two brutal realities. First, after India, Brazil is now the democracy in the world with the largest number of citizens who live in absolute poverty. Second, of all the democracies in the world, Brazil has the worst index of inequality (Mexico not being a democracy). No other democracy is remotely close.<sup>1</sup> These are challenges the New Republic must address if it is to prosper and to have substantive, as well as formal, content.

However, it is also critically important that the military, the state, political society, and civil society devote some attention to the analysis of the specifically military dimension of actions that might be supportive of--or resistive to--the consolidation of a democratic polity.

Let me first address the question of what type of military emerged from the Brazilian BA. In comparison to Argentina and Chile, the Brazilian BA began under a less intense crisis and the military took less dramatic steps. Congress was not closed, the principle of some forms of elections was retained, and the principle of routine presidential succession never abolished. These procedural mechanisms gave the Brazilian polity and the military greater room for flexibility than in any other BA.

On a per capita basis, at least one hundred times more people were killed by the state repressive apparatus in Chile and Argentina than were killed in Brazil. The Argentine book Nunca Mas argues that more than eight thousand people "disappeared" or died in political violence.<sup>2</sup> The Brazilian book Nunca Mais contains less than two hundred names.<sup>3</sup> There undoubtedly were more, but the difference in proportions remains vital. The fact that amnesty in Brazil was given in 1979 and accepted by much of the polity as a "mutual amnesty" contrasts sharply with the last minute self-amnesty the military unsuccessfully tried to decree for themselves in Uruguay and Argentina. This is not meant to minimize the great torture and systematic violations of

human rights in Brazil but simply to indicate that the legacy of hatred left by the BA is not going to be as extremely difficult as that in Argentina or the frightening legacy that already exists in Chile.

The Argentine military left power because after losing the Malvinas war their internal disunity threatened their very institutional survival. Having departed in absolute professional and political disgrace, all of the junta members are presently being tried. Less than two years after the transition, para-military terrorism is on the rise and the military and political society both feel intense insecurity. The Brazilian military left power with their internal structures largely reconstructed and intact, largely due to Geisel's presidency, but with less prestige and less legitimacy than at any time from the declaration of the Republic in 1889 to the advent of the BA in 1964. This is not bad for democracy. In fact, political society in the constitutions of 1891, 1934 and 1946 voluntarily gave the military excessive legally-based legitimacy to be routinely involved in political life.<sup>4</sup> It is extremely doubtful that the constituent assembly that is to convene after the 1986 elections will grant the military such wide constitutional prerogatives.

We do not have systematic data on the recruitment and composition of the officer corps in the 1964-1985 student enrollments almost tripled in the Brazilian university system between 1970 and 1980, the opening up of many new middle-class career opportunities in an economy whose real GNP increased by a factor of 7 from 1950 to 1980,<sup>5</sup> and the indication that officer corps recruitment became less competitive and more caste-like, the comparative intellectual weight of the military in the Brazilian polity is certainly less than it was in the 1940s or 1950s.

However, if the army is not associated with repression, if recruitment is opened up and pay scales increased, the officer recruitment pool could be improved and could approximate those of other democracies. From the viewpoint of those officers who are concerned with the long-term quality of officer recruits into the military as institution, democracy could possibly be seen as superior to military rule.

While the Brazilian military leaves office with less prestige than it had in 1964, it is the only BA with some key generals of the regime (such as Ernesto Geisel and Golbery de Couta e Silva) retaining a significant degree of respect in wide quarters of civil society.

Let me mention five less obvious factors about the current status of the Brazilian military in 1985, and their implications for democracy in the New Republic.

1. Military Perceptions of Long-Term Budgetary Trends
2. The Military-Industrial Complex
3. The Promotion Law for Generals
4. Possible Alternative Professional Roles for Officers
5. The Role of the Military in the Intelligence Apparatus

If understood properly and handled with care, none of these five issue areas present insurmountable problems for the New Republic. In fact, although it may seem paradoxical, the first four contain elements that actually could strengthen democracy.

#### 1. Military Perception of Long-Term Budget Trends

In my Democratizing Brazil (forthcoming), I mentioned that at least five separate active duty generals and admirals complained forcefully that the military budget had declined sharply since 1974. They specifically argued that the military as institution could more effectively lobby for their legitimate needs if the military as government were not in office. I also mentioned that no officer ever advanced this as an argument for military exit in Chile, Uruguay or Argentina. The Brazilian military argument seemed terribly counter-intuitive; however, at least it was an empirical assertion I could investigate. The results of my analysis of the Brazilian military budget were the following:

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TABLE 1

MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN BRAZIL,  
1972-1981\*

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>EXPENDITURES</u>
1972	2172
1973	2402
1974	2346
1975	2245
1976	2616
1977	2252
1978	2117
1979	1940
1980	1964
1981	1837

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\*Figures are in U.S. \$ million at constant 1981 prices.

Source: U.S. Government, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982 (Washington, D.C., April 1984), 19.

The absolute decline in Brazilian military expenditures as depicted in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) data is so surprising that I decided to contrast it with four different data sets. While they differ sharply in what they count as military expenditures, all four data sets show an absolute decline in Brazilian military expenditures from 1970 to 1980 (see Table 2).

TABLE 2  
BRAZILIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES, ACCORDING TO FOUR DIFFERENT SOURCES,  
1970-1980\*

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
UN	1599	2200	2332	2792	1656	--	--	--	--	--	--
IMF	1302	1354	1452	1727	1757	1754	2095	1988	2042	1609	--
Stockholm	--	2199	2333	2792	1957	2077	2312	2069	1951	1740	1362
Local	--	1862	1913	2051	1693	1806	2042	2108	1736	1512	1157

\*Figures are in U.S. \$million, at constant 1978 prices.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, 1983 (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1983), 188.

Notes:

"UN" refers to the United Nations Statistical Yearbook series.

"IMF" refers to the International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics Yearbook series.

"Stockholm" refers to SIPRI's own calculations.

"Local" refers to Anuario Estatístico do Brasil, and to various publications of the Ministerio de Planejamento de Coordenação Geral.

As SIPRI notes, "the figures for 'constant price' military expenditure become more unreliable when inflation is rapid and unpredictable. Supplementary allocations, made during the course of the year to cover losses in purchasing power, often go unreported and recent military expenditure can appear to be falling in real terms. This is a particular problem in Latin America where, for example, the two major military powers in the region, Argentina and Brazil, have had particularly high inflation since the mid-1970s" (p. 178).

Since the Brazilian Gross National Product, in constant 1981 dollars, more than trebled between 1972 and 1982, military expenditures as a percentage of GNP fell sharply during this period (see Table 3).

TABLE 3  
BRAZILIAN GNP AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES,  
1972-1982\*

YEAR	GNP	MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP
1972	81,542	1.4
1973	98,202	1.3
1974	116,975	1.2
1975	134,046	1.1
1976	155,152	1.1
1977	173,016	0.9
1978	193,434	0.8
1979	223,020	0.7
1980	260,812	0.7
1981	274,214	0.7
1982	295,648	N.A.

\*Figures are in U.S. \$ million, at constant 1981 prices.

Source: U.S. Government, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982 (Washington, D.C., April 1984), 19.

Using the same ACDA data, how does the Brazilian data compare with the other three bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay? (See Tables 4 and 5.)

TABLE 4  
THE ARMED FORCES OF FOUR  
BUREAUCRATIC-AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES:  
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND URUGUAY  
1972-1982

YEAR	ARMED FORCES (IN THOUSANDS)				ARMED FORCES PER 1,000 PEOPLE			
	A.	B.	C.	U.	A.	B.	C.	U.
1972	140	410	75	20	5.7	4.1	7.7	7.1
1973	160	420	75	20	6.5	4.1	7.6	7.1
1974	150	435	90	25	6.0	4.1	9.0	8.9
1975	160	455	110	25	6.3	4.2	10.8	8.9
1976	155	450	111	28	6.0	4.1	10.7	8.9
1977	155	450	111	28	5.9	4.0	10.6	9.7
1978	155	450	111	28	5.8	3.9	10.4	9.7
1979	155	450	111	28	5.7	3.8	10.3	9.7
1980	155	450	116	28	5.6	3.7	10.5	9.7
1981	155	450	116	29	5.4	3.6	10.4	9.7
1982	175	460	116	29	6.0	3.6	10.3	10.0

Source: U.S. Government, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982 (Washington, D.C., April 1984), 17-49.

TABLE 5  
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND GNP OF FOUR BUREAUCRATIC-AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES:  
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND URUGUAY, 1972-1982

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME)*			GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP)*			ME GNP %		
	A.	B.	U.	A.	B.	U.	A.	B.	U.
1972	1541	2172	202	109242	158621	26225	1.4	1.4	2.8
1973	1716	2402	204	113279	180823	24639	1.5	1.3	3.7
1974	1986	2346	252	120522	198064	24759	1.6	1.2	4.9
1975	2575	2245	254	119572	208132	21047	2.2	1.1	4.8
1976	2863	2616	215	118622	227925	21934	2.4	1.1	4.1
1977	3134	2252	234	126103	240061	24252	2.5	0.9	4.0
1978	3381	2117	238	121353	249901	26220	2.8	0.8	4.2
1979	3285	1940	264	130140	265638	28254	2.5	0.7	3.6
1980	2995	1964	296	130734	285145	30346	2.3	0.7	3.6
1981	3186	1837	363	120403	274214	31620	2.6	0.7	3.7
1982	N.A.	N.A.	386	113516	278875	27167	N.A.	N.A.	4.8

\*Figures are in U.S. \$ million, in constant 1981 prices.

Source: U.S. Government, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982, (Washington, D.C., April 1984), 17-49.



The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), using somewhat different data than ACDA, but with an internally consistent methodology, has compiled comparative data for twenty-three Latin American countries for the period 1974 to 1982. According to SIPRI, Brazil, which in 1976 spent twice as much of its Gross Domestic Product on military expenses as did Mexico, by 1981 shared with Mexico the lowest ratio of military expenditures to GDP in all of Latin America. Astoundingly, if the very preliminary estimates for the Malvinas crisis year of 1982 are subsequently confirmed, in that year Chile spent over 14 times as much of its GDP on military expenditures than did Brazil; Argentina almost 11 times as much; and Uruguay almost six times as much (see Table 6).

TABLE 6

LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES  
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
<u>Central America</u>									
Costa Rica	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.7	(0.7)	0.6	0.6	0.7
Cuba	3.6	(3.7)	---	7.3	7.6	7.8	7.2	7.5	8.0
Dominican Republic	1.6	1.6	1.9	1.7	1.8	2.0	1.5	1.6	---
El Salvador	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.9	(2.1)	2.6	3.4	4.0
Guatemala	0.9	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	(1.7)	[1.9]
Haiti	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.3	[1.6]	[2.1]	[1.8]	---	---
Honduras	1.6	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.3	2.3	[4.5]	[4.7]	[5.0]
Jamaica	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.9	[0.9]	[0.9]	[0.9]	---	---
Mexico	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5
Nicaragua	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.3	3.1	3.4	6.0	[6.3]	[6.7]
Panama	0.7	0.8	0.8	[0.7]	[0.7]	[0.7]	[0.7]	---	---
Trinidad & Tobago	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	[0.3]	[0.3]	[0.4]	---	[0.5]
<u>South America</u>									
Argentina	1.7	2.0	2.4	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.9	[6.4]
Bolivia	1.8	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.2	1.9	2.6	2.5
Brazil	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.6
Chile	6.7	5.7	5.3	6.2	6.4	6.5	7.4	6.4	[8.5]
Colombia	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.3
Ecuador	1.9	2.3	1.9	2.9	2.1	2.0	1.9	(1.8)	(1.4)
Guyana	4.0	6.6	10.7	6.9	(5.1)	[7.2]	[8.6]	[9.6]	---
Paraguay	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.3	[1.4]	[1.5]	[1.6]
Peru	3.5	4.6	5.0	7.3	5.5	3.9	(5.7)	(7.2)	(6.8)
Uruguay	2.8	2.6	2.1	2.3	2.7	(2.9)	2.5	3.3	[3.4]
Venezuela	1.5	15.	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.4	1.5	1.6	(1.6)

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, 1984, (N.Y.: Taylor and Francis, 1984), 129-131.

Conventions: --- Information not available or not applicable  
( ) Uncertain data  
[ ] Estimates with a high degree of uncertainty

Note: Cuban figures represent percentages of Gross Material Product.

Finally, using the same SIPRI data, let us contrast the Brazilian military expenditures as a percentage of GDP with many of the other democracies of the world (see Table 7).

TABLE 7  
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS  
DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR SOME OF THE MAJOR  
DEMOCRACIES IN THE WORLD,  
1974-1983

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Brazil	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.6
India	3.0	3.3	3.2	3.0	2.9	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.1
Japan	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
NATO									
<u>North America:</u>									
Canada	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.1
U.S.A.	6.1	5.9	5.4	5.3	5.1	5.1	5.6	5.8	6.5
<u>EUROPE:</u>									
Belgium	2.8	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4
Denmark	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5
France	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.0	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.2
FR Germany	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4
Greece	5.6	6.8	6.9	7.0	6.7	6.3	5.7	7.0	7.0
Italy	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6
Luxembourg	0.8	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	..
Netherlands	3.2	3.4	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.3
Norway	3.0	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.0
Portugal	7.4	5.3	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4
UK	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.7	4.6	4.7	5.1	4.9	5.1
<u>OTHER EUROPE:</u>									
Austria	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2
Finland	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6
Ireland	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0
Spain	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.1
Sweden	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.3
Switzerland	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, 1984 (N.Y.: Taylor and Francis, 1984), 127-131.

Conventions:

- .. Information not available or not applicable
- () Uncertain data
- [] Estimates with a high degree of uncertainty

Attention should be brought at this time to the fact that the 1982 figures presented in Tables 6 and 7 for Brazil (0.6%), Costa Rica (0.7%) and Mexico (0.5%) represent the three lowest figures for all 117 nations on which SIPRI collects data, thus making Brazil the democracy with the lowest level of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP in the world, and the nation with the second lowest level of all major nations in the world.<sup>6</sup>

What can we say about the implications of the data contained in these tables? Skeptics will of course challenge the data. They will say that the Brazilian military "disguised" a lot of their costs. The two major sources of hidden expenditures are the annual "special credits" that are given to the military, and the extensive expenses listed under non-military research and development or industrial research expenses that are in fact related to the arms industries. For the sake of argument, let us make two major assumptions. First, that even though the best estimate of Brazilian military expenditures is that 70% is spent on personnel (where costs are relatively difficult to disguise) we should nonetheless assume that the Brazilian military spends twice as much as the ACDA data indicate. The second assumption is that in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, there have been absolutely no hidden military expenditures, so we will accept the ACDA data as is. Even if we made these two assumptions, Brazil in 1981, according to ACDA calculations, would have spent only 1.4% of its GNP on military expenditures, compared to 2.6% in Argentina, 3.7% in Chile, and 3.2% in Uruguay.<sup>7</sup> If we use SIPRI estimates, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay would have spent even higher proportions on military-related expenses.

From the perspective of basic human needs of the poor and the survival of the species world expenditures for weapons of destruction are too high. However, in purely comparative terms, the Brazilian military budgetary situation at the end of the authoritarian regime was reasonably auspicious, both for the Brazilian military and for the New Republic. Auspicious for the military because in comparison to the other BAs military expenses are low enough that there are not great societal pressures to slash them. Auspicious for the new democratic regime because the new regime by comparative world world standards has a very low military expenditure to GNP and is not immediately forced into a confrontation with the military over grossly inflated expenditures. In fact, for the rank-and-file officers and soldiers in distant garrisons, and, in deed, for many leaders of the military as institution, the Brazilian situation in the early 1980s was similar to that of Spain in the early 1970s. That is, many members of the military felt the authoritarian regime had rather neglected their needs; they did not perceive a major budgetary imperative to maintain the authoritarian regime, and some key leaders even thought they would fare better as a budgetary pressure group under a democratic regime.<sup>8</sup>

## 2. The Military-Industrial Complex

Here again the Brazilian data are surprising. Virtually all military organizations in the world desire a high degree of national autonomy of arms production. The Brazilian military regime passed through three distinct phases in its conscious effort to build up a more autonomous military-industrial complex. From 1964-1967, the private industrial federation of Sao Paulo

(FIESP), in consultation with the military authorities, created a Permanent Group for Industrial Mobilization (GPMI) that focused explicitly on forging an arms industry. This was of mutual interest because at the time there was great excess capacity in the depressed Brazilian economy. The GPMI was explicitly supported by the Air Force's Center for Aerospace Technology (CTA), the Army's Institute of Military Engineering, and the Navy's Center of Marine Research. In the second phase (1967-1975) of the development of the Brazilian military-industrial complex, the Air Force in 1969 created an industrial firm (EMBRAER) for the manufacture of military and commercial airplanes. The Army Ministry, working closely with the two national private industries ENGESA and BERNARDINI, extended Brazil's massive automobile and truck-making capacity into the field of armored personnel carriers and light tanks, which had particularly good suspension systems. The Navy, working with Brazil's large and underutilized shipbuilding industry, began to build ships.

The third major phase of the Brazilian arms industry began around 1975 with state holding companies working closely with the National Security Council, the Foreign Ministry, and the National Industrial Confederation to mount a heavily subsidized, but efficient arms export industry.<sup>9</sup>

Brazil exported virtually no arms in 1970. SIPRI data for 1981 indicate that Brazil already was by far the largest arm exporter in the Third World (see Table 8).<sup>10</sup>

TABLE 8

## THIRD WORLD MAJOR WEAPON-EXPORTING COUNTRIES

1973-79 (ACDA) <sup>a</sup>			1979-1981 (SIPRI) <sup>b</sup>		
Country	Value (US \$ million)	Percentage of Total Developing Countries' Exports	Country	Value (US \$ million)	Percentage of Total Third World Exports
Israel	610	15.5	Brazil	453	45.6
South Korea	360	9.1	Israel	210	21.1
Saudi Arabia	300	7.6	Libya	122	12.3
Brazil	290	7.4	South Korea	31	3.2
North Korea	230	7.1	Egypt	61	6.2
Bulgaria	170	4.3	Saudi Arabia	16	1.6
Cuba	160	4.1	Others	50	5.0
Egypt	140	3.5			
Iran	140	3.6			
Libya	125	3.2			
Others	1,365	34.6			
Total	3,940 <sup>c</sup>	100.0	Total	993	100.0

Sources: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1970-1979* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 35-126; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1982* (London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1982), p. 188.

<sup>a</sup>The ACDA data include weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities considered primarily military in nature.

<sup>b</sup>The SIPRI data include four categories of major weapons: aircraft, armored vehicles, missiles, and warships.

<sup>c</sup>This total value does not include the PRC's arms exports.

Source: Young-sun Ha, "South Korea," in *Arms Production in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Decision Making*, ed. James E. Katz (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), 230.

By 1982 the International Defense Review ranked Brazil as the fifth largest exporter of arms in the world, after the United States, the USSR, France and West Germany. John Hoyt Williams goes so far as to assert that "at least forty nations are importing Brazilian military goods, and Brasilia's forecast of \$3 billion in military sales is perhaps on the conservative side."<sup>11</sup> Whatever the exact details (and there is much dispute and great secrecy in this area), it is clear that the Brazilian military emerged from the BA with by far the most powerful arms industry in the Third World and as the only BA with a significant arms export industry at all.

Once again, what are the implications of this for our task at hand, the role of the Brazilian military in the polity and its impact on democracy? A key point that needs to be recognized is that non-military industrialists, both domestic and foreign, are a major component in the military-industrial complex. Clovis Brigagao estimates that 50 Brazilian firms directly produce military equipment, that 350-400 firms supply parts, and that 200,000 people are involved in the arms industry.<sup>12</sup> Hoyt estimates that half of the major firms are in the private sector.<sup>13</sup> ENGESA is headed by a civilian, and as de Barros notes, "the [1982] decision of the Army Ministry to fire the president of IMBEL (a four-star general) and replace him with a civilian engineer (the president of ENGESA) seems to have represented an Army drive for greater efficiency."<sup>14</sup>

Let us directly address the question of the impact of this huge military-industrial complex on the future of democracy. I want to advance a heretical argument. One of the reasons that makes Third World armies so eager to control the governments of their countries (they normally do so in more than half of the countries) is that they are acutely aware that they are almost totally dependent on the importation of foreign arms and they have no significant internal civilian constituency that has a structurally vested interest in domestic arms development and production. This thus becomes a strong motivation for controlling the government and the nation's budget. If one accepts this argument then the creation of a massive national arms producing and exporting industry involving hundreds of firms with a permanent structural interest in arms production lessens two of the most powerful and distinctive reasons for dependent Third World armies to assume direct power. With an increased arms producing capacity and the development of a strong constituency in civil society politically articulating their interests, this major arms buildup is politically defused--and even gains some legitimacy--precisely because of the powerful export dimensions in the normal context of balance of payment problems. In the particular case of Brazil, the presence of a massive arms producing and exporting capacity means that some of the specific reasons why the military might want to seize control of the government are lessened.

From this perspective, Brazil's civil-military industrial complex may paradoxically strengthen the chances for democracy. There is, however, a major policy issue for democratic theory and practice. Virtually all major western democracies have a military-industrial complex. But the question these raise is not that they directly threaten to overthrow the government, the normal Third World dependent military threat. Rather, the very serious question for democratic theory and practice becomes how can political society control these complexes so that they do not misallocate resources and threaten peace. These are major problems in all western democracies--especially the

United States--but it is a different problem than those faced by Third World polities with dependent, insecure militaries. Brazil now has a serious issue for the democratic practice of control, but I suggest that Brazil is the only Third World country where the issue is more one of control and direction than that of threats to the existence of democratic regimes, per se.

### 3. Promotion Law for Generals

Until the Brazilian BA began, the Brazilian army had no fixed criteria for the retirement of four-star generals. That meant that some famous generals, such as Goes Monteiro and Cordeiro de Farias, served anywhere from nine to twenty years as four-star generals and maybe up to thirty years with the rank of General. This meant that there was the potential for major military leaders to develop great followings within the army and even within the Brazilian polity. For reasons that still have to be fully explored, the first president of the military regime, Castello Branco, imposed a new law of military promotions that placed a maximum amount of time for an officer to hold each rank of General. No four-star could hold that rank on active duty for more than four years.<sup>15</sup>

The implication of the law for the role of the military in the Brazilian polity is that in comparison to the 1950s and early 1960s, the Brazilian military in the 1980s will have no four-star generals with such immense military and national experience at the apex of power. From a theoretical perspective this would seem to reduce the brokering capacity of famous generals to mobilize national constituencies within the Army and within the polity that was such a distinctive element in the pre-1964 "moderating power" model I described in my book, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil.<sup>16</sup>

The reduction of the Army's capacity to play the moderating role thus reduces one of the most distinctive qualities of the historic role of the Brazilian military in national politics. This does not necessarily mean that the military will intervene in politics less. After all, many Third World countries have similar promotion laws and frequent military coups. It does mean, however, that Brazil will never again have general-politicians who will bring the subtlety and experience of a Cordeiro de Farias ever again.<sup>17</sup> That generation is gone, and with the present promotion law, can never be recreated in the future. Those partisans who still believe that members of the Brazilian military are uniquely politically experienced and capable of playing the moderating role should bear these new institutional realities in mind and be aware that if they are ever tempted to call the military from the barracks again the generals they summon will not have the mobilizational capacity or political experience of old. They will be more like their counterparts in the rest of Latin America: faceless generals whose major claim to power is their very recent arrival at the top of a bureaucracy of the force of arms.

### 4. Possible Alternative Professional Roles for Officers

For the last twenty-one years a major part of the professional identification

of the leaders of the Brazilian Army has been supplied by their role as direct managers of the polity and struggle against internal enemies. Theorists about military, both inside and outside of the military, have worried about the "crisis of mission" the Brazilian military would experience when and if they left power. This lack of professional mission was seen as a dangerous destabilizing force that would motivate them to reconquer government.

The extraordinary expansion of Brazil's role in the world economy, the Malvinas War, and the growth of the arms export industry may however have reduced the threat by giving them a sense of multiple missions. The Brazilian military, especially in the Navy, is increasingly aware that Brazil has economic and political interests throughout the world, a major commercial shipping activity and one of the longest coast lines in the world. However, naval leaders frequently argue that Brazil has almost no military capacity to project its power, and to protect its interests, on a global scale. The whole world knows that when South Africa attacked Angola, Cuba came to their defense with arms. They tend to forget that the Geisel government, with its strategic interest in Angolan oil, was one of the first countries in the world to recognize Angola and that at the same time that Cuba was sending arms, Brazil dispatched three ships laden with food to feed the besieged MPLA government in Luanda.<sup>18</sup>

The Malvinas War was a disaster for the Argentine military. The post-Malvinas trials have stiffened the Chilean military's resolve to retain power. The Brazilian military, however, "read" Malvinas quite differently, and in ways that could help democracy. The biggest impression Malvinas made on them was that the Argentine military, since it had organized itself to dominate internal enemies, was completely unprepared to fight a major international power. They were particularly struck by the virtual total incapacity for combined Army, Navy and Air Force actions. Upon reflection they realized that they too have almost no professional training or experience in maneuvering joint task forces. The interest in increasing purely military professionalism in post-Malvinas Brazil is clearly much stronger than before and has worked towards resolving the military mission identity crisis.

Finally, the fact that Brazil exports arms to forty countries in the world opens up a whole range of lucrative foreign military advising and mission roles for Brazil's military corps. Under the aegis of Brazil's excellent and aggressive professional foreign service (*Itamaraty*) arms deliveries to conflict-ridden or oil-rich countries will be used to gain a strategic foothold for Brazil in new markets.

##### 5. The Role of the Military in the Intelligence Apparatus

I have detailed the enormous expansion of Brazil's security apparatus elsewhere. The SNI's monopoly of functions is, as I demonstrated, completely without parallel in any democratic country in the world. Military organizations throughout the world attempt to strengthen their nation's security apparatus and their own role within that apparatus. The Brazilian BA did this in statutorily sanctioned ways not found in any other BA. However, normally at the fall of an authoritarian regime, one of the first organizations to be dismantled (witness Portugal and Greece) is the hated secret police. Brazil

is unusual in this respect because the SNI, in the first months of the New Republic, while liberalizing its style, has offered its vast organizational capacities to the government--and they have been accepted and utilized. In fact, one observer has half-jokingly commented that because it was the only part of the government that the opposition was not clamoring to enter it remained the most organized and unified part of the government. In the short run, the fact that the military have seen that the security apparatus has not been dismantled, and that all top officers remain military officers has lessened military fears about the New Republic. But, in the medium run, if the New Republic wants to democratize the state they will have to restructure and demilitarize the SNI and create the complex system of monitoring found in all other democracies. All major democracies have armed forces, intelligence systems and military-industrial complexes. But all major democracies must devote the creative energies of civil society, political society and even the state to control them. Let us turn to this critical subject.



DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS:  
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SOCIETY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE

This topic needs extensive treatment, serious thought, and frank discussion by all theorists and practitioners concerned with the consolidation of democracy. What follow are some preliminary thoughts on what should be a major debate.

Civil Society

Democracy is about the open contestation for power via elections and the oversight and control of state power by the representativeness of the people. In virtually all polities of the world, and very much so in Latin America, the military are a permanent factor in any calculus of power. Therefore, by definition, civil society must consider how it can make a contribution to the democratic control of military and intelligence systems. It is an obvious point but one that bears repeating that the capacity of the military as a complex institution to develop a consensus for intervention is greatly aided to the extent that civil society "knocks on the doors" of the barracks. In 1964 in Brazil, and in Chile in 1973, many powerful representatives of civil society--including the church--"knocked on the door" and created the "Brumairean moment." The transitional military governments hoped for by many middle-class and upper-class members of civil society became long-lasting bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes with significant interests of their own. It is important to theoretically and politically understand that this phenomenon is one of the predictable consequences of "knocking on the door," and that "Brumairean moments" can turn into praetorian decades. This fundamental point aside, what else is important for civil society to consider? Obviously, as Weffort has stressed, it is terribly important that civil society revalorize democracy as a permanent value and not just as a temporary tactic.

Turning specifically to the technical capacities of civil society viz-à-viz the military and intelligence systems, what could be done that has not really been done in the past? Let us return to our discussion of the "liberal bias." Latin American social scientists have become the leaders of the world social science community in conceptualizing the realities and implications of the new global political economy. They have also done some of the best work in the world on social movements and popular culture. However, until recently the formal study of military organizations and international relations--especially geopolitics, and most specifically the study of territorial disputes and military strategy--has been neglected. Those civilians who have concerned themselves with these matters have tended to be professors who attended institutions such as the Escola Superior de Guerra in Brazil or Argentina's Escuela Nacional de Guerra where the intellectual agenda was set by the military and where, sanctioned by national security doctrine, French, U.S. and Latin American military Cold War and internal subversion preoccupations are dominant. This situation has often meant that few members of the democratic opposition in civil society were specialists on these matters and wrote alternative geopolitical works. In Argentina especially, this has privileged the military perception of the country's geomilitary problems. Most major democracies have at least one major civilian-led independent research institute

that concentrates on international military politics. In the United States the Brookings Institution has often supplied authoritative and well-researched expert alternative assessments of military strategy. In England the International Institute for Strategic Studies performs a comparable function. The creation of such prestigious, independent and civilian-led institutes would seem to be high on the agenda of civil society. Latin American universities have to date also not routinely incorporated military sociology and military strategy into their curricula. This is a vital task because the newspapers, television and weeklies should have military experts on their staffs. Just as importantly, the constant academic production of a cadre of citizens who are masters of the force structure, organizational style, budgetary questions, doctrinal questions and the specific details of weapons systems are indispensable for the fulfillment of the military and intelligence oversight function of political society, especially in the legislative branch.

### Political Society

Most major stable democracies have crafted over time permanent standing committees in their legislatures or cabinets which devote themselves exclusively to the routine oversight and monitoring of their country's military and intelligence systems. These committees characteristically have professional staffs who are specialists in matters of military strategy, budgeting or intelligence. Often these staffs pull their talent from both the ranks of the professional civil service and from the political parties. For purposes of illustration, I attach an appendix that provides details on the standing military and intelligence committees in the United States (see Appendix). In Latin American legislatures, such permanent committees with large staffs and independent research capacities often either do not exist or are understaffed and with few resources. What is needed therefore is a deliberate strategy for the empowerment of legislatures to carry out their military and intelligence oversight function in a routine democratic legislative fashion.

Military and intelligence officials do occasionally appear before the legislature in Latin American, but most often this occurs under the circumstances of a special tribunal of inquiry established to examine a particular controversy. From the perspective of comparative civil-military relations in a democracy, this is a dangerous and ineffective review mechanism for three fundamental reasons. First, precisely because it is ad hoc and not a standing committee, legislative leaders are not supported by a cadre of professional staff members with expert knowledge of the intricacies of the field. Second, by its very nature, an ad hoc special commission of inquiry occurs in a controversial, conflictual setting which tends to increase the latent paranoia most military organizations throughout the world have about political "interference" in their professional activities. Thus, a primary requirement must be to reduce the atmosphere of exceptional confrontational inquiry, by making the military's appearance before legislative leaders a routine normal occurrence. Third, if political party leaders know that these permanent standing committees are a routine yet important part of legislative life, some members of all parties will attempt to conduct or chair these committee meetings in a respectful, but deeply authoritative, manner. The routinization of legislative-military transactions can help reduce mutual fears and ignorance of military leaders and party leaders alike. The self-empowerment of legislatures in national

security matters is both an imperative and a possible goal.

### The State

Social scientists have noted that the Latin American state--even under democratic regimes--plays a larger role in the economy and in the polity than in most Western European or North American democracies. Adherents to the 19th century school of liberalism deplore this. But, more to the point, this is a consequence of Latin America's structural-historical legacy and is likely to remain so. The task at hand for democratic theorists and practitioners in any concrete setting is to attempt to craft democratic mechanisms of state control that are both feasible and appropriate to that setting. An example: Analysts have long noted that state enterprises play a much larger role in capital accumulation in Latin America than in Western Europe or North America. In the last few years there have been efforts initiated either by the legislatures or by the rulers of the state apparatus to create mechanisms for the coordination, control and oversight of these often very autonomous state enterprises. This is the very real task of nationalizing and democratizing the nationalized industries. In Brazil, SEST (the Secretariat of Planning's Special Secretariat for the Control of State Enterprises) could be considered the forerunner of such an effort.<sup>19</sup> Peru has recently established a state enterprise oversight mechanism both in the legislature and within the central government itself.

Working together, political society in the legislature and democratic government leaders of the state apparatus can also begin the difficult task of restructuring military and intelligence systems so they are more consistent with the normal checks and balances of democratic regimes. Elsewhere, I have indicated how--without attacking, dismantling, or, for the most part, demoralizing their intelligence systems--England, France and the United States have crafted mechanisms for the democratic management, monitoring and oversight of their intelligence systems.<sup>20</sup> In Brazil, even using the existing laws drafted by the BA, the New Republic could eventually demilitarize the four top officers in the SNI--none of which are required by law to be occupied by military officers. This would remove the army from direct control of the intelligence system, something many professional officers would welcome as they feel that the SNI collects dossiers on them and heavily influences promotion patterns for reasons that may be extraneous to the officers' own professional capacity, but of direct interest to the SNI's own bureaucratic concerns.

The post-Malvinas concern of Latin American militaries, especially in Brazil, to upgrade their professional capacity for joint operations may present a propitious argument for changes in the military's representation in democratic governments. The democratic government of Brazil's New Republic has twenty-six ministers, six of whom are active-duty military officers. These cabinet ministers are: the Minister of the Air Force; the Minister of the Navy; the Minister of the Army; the Director of the SNI; the Head of the Military Household; and, the Chief of the Joint General Staff of the Armed Forces. All but the last of these positions are quite important in a crisis discussion of Brazilian state politics. Thus, even under a democracy the military remains deeply involved in the day-to-day political discussion

of Brazil's affairs. The pattern of the three service chiefs and the intelligence director all having Cabinet status is quite often replicated in other Latin American countries, even under democratic regimes.<sup>21</sup> Such representation is, of course, to a great extent a direct reflection of the power capacity of the military in Latin American democracies. To my knowledge, in any given year under non-wartime conditions normally not even one Western European or North American democracy has even one active-duty military with full Cabinet status.

Three possible changes initiated within the state apparatus by new democratic leaders are worth serious theoretical and political discussion, and while they would be resisted they might even present some advantages for the military as institution and could thus possibly gain some military adherents. First, given the newly appreciated military sense of the importance of effective joint inter-service professional operational capacity--and the military's recognition that historic inter-service rivalry makes this virtually impossible--it is conceivable that a single civilian Minister of Defense could replace the traditional Ministers of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Politically, this would be easiest to implement if some new resources for joint operations were added to the budget, but Brazil is the only BA where this is presently possible. Argentina under Alfonsín has created a Minister of Defense, but it was under such confrontational circumstances and in the midst of such a financial crisis that no new resources for joint operations were made available that might otherwise have softened the blow. Second, the intelligence chief could be removed from ministerial status, especially if the institutional power of a monolithic organization such as the SNI in Brazil were divided into separate organizations for external and internal intelligence and if the chief presidential advisor for intelligence did not also command large operational service. Third, Latin American liberal politicians are deeply suspicious of the idea of an important National Security Council with permanent military representatives. However, if the military representatives have institutional voice but not institutional command within such an organization it could in fact strengthen democracy. Precisely because the military constitute a permanent factor of power in all politics it is better to encapsulate them professionally--but not politically--into the state apparatus.

Military ministers are widely understood in the Latin America military to be political, not professional, appointments to the cabinet. Thus, paradoxically, even with five or six military ministers the military at times perceives that their enduring professional interests are not represented in the democratic government. If, however, a serious National Security Council were established, where the military as institution is represented and has regular substantive transactions with other top officials also concerned with national security, the psychological dimension of the swing of the pendulum from total military control of the state apparatus to the opposite liberal fantasy that the military as an institution can be isolated from politics might be lessened.

In summation, increasing effective control of the military and intelligence systems requires an effort by civil and political society to empower themselves by increasing their own capacity for control. Within the state a paradoxical mix of fewer politically appointed military ministers and more systematic professional incorporation into serious standing National Security Councils

might reduce the military's sense of isolation and create a more cybernetic system of mutual exchange of information and grievances, and thus lessen the tendency for the pendulum to swing so violently.

## NOTES

1. See Tables 3 and 4 in Cardoso's article in Alfred C. Stepan (ed.), Democratizing Brazil, (forthcoming).

2. Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desaparición de Personas, Nunca Más, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1985).

3. Nunca Mais.

4. See my Military in Politics, pp. 73-79, where I analyze the constitutionally sanctioned political roles voluntarily granted to the military by political elites.

5. In an August 1981 interview with the author, General Octavio Costa said, "in the 1930s and 1940s people who were lower middle class and good in the exact sciences or engineering had few other outlets and chose the Army. This is much less true now. In 1939 there might have been 4,000 candidates for 200 places. Now people from military high schools, with a grade above 6, pass directly into the military academy. In most cases, these are sons of military personnel, so the caste element has increased. For some years, 260 of the 300 places are filled up by military high schools before there is a national open competition." (Interview, Rio de Janeiro). For my data on the growth of the Brazilian GNP and the growth of higher education, see Table 3 in Cardoso's article.

6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, 1984 (New York, 1984), 127-131.

7. One of these assumptions seems forced, the other absurd. These two assumptions are extreme. A pioneering book on Brazil's military expenditures and the arms industry was published in 1984 by Clovis Brigagao, O Mercado da Segurança: Ensaio sobre Economia Política da Defesa, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira). This is a major, well-documented book in the critical Seymour Melman school, and to my knowledge, the best book of this genre ever published about Latin America. Brigagao makes three assertions relevant to the argument at hand. First, he estimates that Brazil's military expenditures should be broken down into: 70% for personnel, 20% for purchase of equipment, 7% for services, and 3% for other expenses (p. 31). We have documented that the military personnel per capita in Brazil is smaller than in any other BA. Thus the biggest area of hidden expenditures is in the other 30% of the budget, hidden under "special credits" to the armed forces, which he said were \$92 million in 1980 (p. 35), and which, if included in total military expenditures, would increase that figure by roughly 5%. The other major area he documents brilliantly is the hidden research and development infrastructure subsidies to the arms industries. In order to reach our assumption of doubling the percentage of GNP spent on military expenditures (thus increasing the ACDA estimate from \$1,964 million to \$3,928 million) we would have to assume that disguised subsidies to the arms industry amounted to \$1,872 million a year, which seem quite high on the basis of the internal evidence he has provided. I will let the readers make their own assumptions as to whether absolutely all military expenditures, subsidies, and military research and development monies have been recorded by Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, to say nothing of the United States and France.

8. Juan Linz and I taught a course on redemocratization and he discussed the situation of the Spanish military at length. Also, see Juan Linz, "The Transition from an Authoritarian Regime to Democracy in Spain: Some Thoughts for Brazilians" (paper delivered at the Conference on Democratizing Brazil, Yale University, March 2, 1983).

9. The above account and periodization are based on the best source on this story (which is infinitely more complex than I could convey in a few pages). See, Brigagao, O Mercado da Segurança, esp. pp. 15-68. For an excellent assessment of the evolution of the army from the viewpoint of military strategy, see, Alexandre de S.C. Barros, "Brazil" in Arms Production in Developign Countries: An Analysis of Decision Making, ed. James Everett Katz (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), 73-87. See also, John Hoyt Williams, "Brazil: Giant of the Southern Cone," National Defense (November 1982), 16-20; and his, "Brazil: A New Giant in the Arms Industry," Atlantic Monthly (August 1984), 24-27.

10. Williams, "Brazil: A New Giant in the Arms Industry," 25.

11. Ibid., 26.

12. Brigagao, O Mercado da Segurança, 47.

13. Williams, "Brazil: A New Giant in the Arms Industry," 25.

14. de Barros, "Brazil," 81.

15. (Full data on law to be supplied and double-checked.)

16. For my discussion of the "moderating pattern," see Military in Politics, 57-121. The key elements of the model are explained on pp. 62-66.

17. Cordeiro de Farias was a leader of the famous tenente rebellion of the 1920s, an interventor in a state in the 1930s, the Artillery Commander in the Brazilian Expeditionary Brigade in Italy during World War II, a leader of the 1964 military movement, and a minister in the post-1964 government. (Footnote on biography of General Cordeiro de Farias to be supplied.)

18. Stumpf and Pereira Filho, A Segund Guerra, 82-84. For a more general account of Brazil's complex worldwide geopolitical strategy, see, Wayne A. Selcher, Brazil's Multilateral Relations: Between First and Third Worlds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), esp. pp. 105-144 and 213-244. For a strong advocacy by a progressive civilian that Brazil should build up its Navy and vitually non-existent Coast Guard, see, Hermano Alves, "A Insegurança Nacional," Afinal (June 18, 1985), 19.

19. For an excellent analysis of existing Brazilian control mechanisms for public enterprises, see, Thomas J. Trebat, Brazil's State-Owned Enterprises: A Case Study of the State as Entrepreneur (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 70-114.

20. See, Stepan, forthcoming, op. cit.

21. As General Abreu points out in his O Outro Lado do Poder, the position of Chief of Military Household (his post under Geisel) is a uniquely Brazilian institution.



APPENDIX ON THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH  
OVERSIGHT ON INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(This appendix was co-authored by Michael J. Fitzpatrick,  
a recent graduate of Columbia University's  
School of International & Public Affairs)

In the United States, legislative branch oversight of the armed services and the intelligence community has historically rested in four committees in Congress: the Appropriations and Armed Services committees of each house. The Appropriations subcommittees on Defense set the funding levels for the U.S. intelligence agencies, concealing these funds in appropriations requests from other agencies--so that not even the full committees, much less the entire House or Senate, know the true funding levels for intelligence agencies when they vote on the annual budget.

While intelligence budgets fall within the jurisdiction of the Appropriations subcommittees, it has been the Armed Services subcommittees which traditionally have been responsible for the review of the structure and some operations of the intelligence community. Formal mechanisms alone, however, do not necessarily transform into operational effectiveness. Up through the mid-1970s these subcommittees were quite inactive. For example, it has been calculated that in the 1960s, the House subcommittees met perhaps six times a year for a total of perhaps 20 hours in an "active" year. The House Armed Services subcommittee met only twice in the two years, 1969-1970. The Senate Armed Services subcommittee met three times in 1969-1970, not at all in 1971, and only once in 1972-1973 to discuss intelligence operations and activities. This was at a time when the two Senate subcommittees had a total of one part-time staffer shared between them.<sup>1</sup>

The situation today is somewhat improved. In the Senate, the Armed Services Committee--on which 18 senators sit--employs roughly 40 people, including support staff, with total salaries and expenses currently running between \$1.5 and \$2 million per annum. It has 6 subcommittees: Manpower and Personnel; Military Construction; Preparedness; Sea Power and Force Projection; Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces; and, Tactical Warfare.

In the House of Representatives, the Armed Services Committee (with 45 congressmen) has a staff and budget comparable in size to its Senate counterpart: approximately 40 employees and \$2 million in total expenses. Its 7 subcommittees cover: Investigations; Military Installations and Facilities; Military Personnel and Compensation; Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems; Readiness; Research and Development; and, Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials.<sup>2</sup>

With the series of revelations of intelligence community abuses in the mid-1970s, most notably from the ad hoc Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the "Church Committee"), formal mechanisms for congressional oversight were greatly enhanced. One notable piece of such legislation, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1975, further increased the number of

committees to be informed of covert operations by requiring that the President inform (although not seek the approval of) the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This legislation had the intentional effect of forcing the President himself to be aware of U.S. covert activities, as previously the executive branch committee which authorized such operations did not always inform him of their decisions.

Hearings before the Senate Government Operations Committee led to the May 1976 establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Currently, this committee employs approximately 40 staffers, with total expenses falling in the same range as the Senate Armed Services Committee (\$1.5 to \$2 million). Its 4 subcommittees cover: Analysis and Production; Budget Authorization; Collection and Foreign Operations; and, Legislation and the Rights of Americans.

A similar committee was established in the House. The House Select Committee on Intelligence, with 14 congressmen and 3 subcommittees (covering Legislation; Oversight and Evaluation; and, Program and Budget Authorization), is much smaller: with a staff of only 21, its most recent budget for total salaries and expenses is under \$1.1 million.<sup>3</sup>

## SOURCES

1. Tyrus G. Fain, ed., The Intelligence Community: History, Organization and Issues (New York and London: R.R. Bowker Co., 1977), pp. 225, 519-523.

2. See, U.S. Senate, Report of the Secretary of the Senate, from October 1, 1983 to March 31, 1984, Part 1, pp. 96-97; Ibid., Report of the Secretary of the Senate, from April 1, 1984 to September 30, 1984, Part 1, pp. 112-113; U.S. House of Representatives, Report of the Clerk of the House, from July 1, 1984 to September 30, 1984, pp. 1527-1530; and, Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics, 1984 (Washington, D.C.: National Journal, 1983).

3. In addition to its 15 members from the two parties, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate are themselves ex officio members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. See, Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics, 1984. Also, see, U.S., Senate, Report of the Secretary of the Senate, from April 1, 1984 to September 30, 1984, Part I, pp. 129-130; and, U.S. House of Representatives, Report of the Clerk of the House, from July 1, 1984 to September 30, 1984, pp. 1641-1642. Also, conversations with David Holliday, staff member of the Senate Intelligence Committee (July 1985) and with Jeanne McNally, Clerk of the House Intelligence Committee (July 1985).