

Chile at the Turning Point

LESSONS OF THE SOCIALIST YEARS, 1970-1973

Gil,
Lagos, &
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Introduction

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On September 11, 1973, Chilean democracy came to an end. Until then Chile had presented an unusual scene in the political panorama of Latin America. Almost from the moment of the country's independence, political life had remained firmly anchored in the constitution. With only two interruptions (both of short duration), its history from 1830 on was one of consistent democratic practice, characterized by constant expansion of the social and political base participating in the system. Though many may question the true nature of this "formal" or "bourgeois" democracy, the continuous process by which new social sectors were gradually incorporated into the decision-making structure cannot be denied. That fact has been amply demonstrated in any number of studies.

The collapse of Chilean democracy was preceded by an effort to build what many saw as a second road to socialism. In the words of Salvador Allende, "Chile faces the necessity of beginning to build a new road to a socialist society: . . . , a pluralist road, one foreseen by the classical theorists of Marxism but never before put into practice. . . . Chile is today the first nation on earth called to follow the second model of transition to a socialist society."¹ But the social system of Chile had shown signs of extraordinary strain even before Allende's rise to power. Insufficient economic growth and greater demands for popular participation in the benefits derived from such growth as there was had combined to produce severe tensions. As long as increases in the gross national product permitted Chilean society to satisfy the needs of new social groups, as long as the demands were small in relation to growth in GNP, the system could absorb new sectors that wanted to participate in the

benefits of a "modernized" society—or, at least, a society en route to modernization. But when economic growth decreased and the rate of incorporation of new sectors increased, a crisis in Chile's democratic order was clearly imminent.

The *coup d'état* signified, on the one hand, the violent end of that second road President Allende had sought to construct; on the other, it brought into being yet another military-authoritarian state in Latin America. These two faces of the *coup* have given rise to a variety of analyses and discussions. The bibliography, be it academic, political, or merely propagandistic, is already enormous.² And the events in Chile have raised numerous questions. Does the attempt to implant socialism within a liberal democratic system inevitably lead to the appearance of an authoritarian state which smothers that attempt? In other words, are the two linked in a causal relationship? Was the *coup d'état* an inevitable outcome of the "Chilean road to socialism"?

Will a democracy, as it was practiced in Chile in 1970, permit a transformation so profound as to facilitate the movement of a society toward socialism? Is the reply to this question so resoundingly negative as to render any such attempt futile from the start? If those who have won an electoral victory threaten to transform society, will those who hold the reins of power in a modern state consent to surrender them out of respect for the existing rules of the political game? Or will they respect those rules only when the system itself is not called into question? When it is, do the rules cease to function? Do they become, in effect, self-destructive? Without doubt this is an old theme, but, to some extent, it is one which the Chilean experience made real for the very first time.

In light of the Chilean experience, the reply to these and other questions would seem clear: the second road to socialism is not viable. On the contrary, the attempt to traverse it leads almost inevitably to the destruction of the democratic system within which the attempt is made. Violence (involving, of course, abandonment of the long-established rules of the game) is the necessary end of the second road. This reply, however, is far too simple to explain the complex reality of Chile between 1970 and 1973. To state it *a priori* is to ignore all sorts of factors that should enter into an analysis of the tragic outcome—particularly those relating to the management of the process. How were the innumerable day-to-day problems confronted? What mechanisms were used to articulate the new society? What economic variables were utilized? How can we account for their success (or failure) and the consequent impact on the viability of the model? And we should not

neglect the errors (or success) of government and the opposition.

It is tempting to use the Chilean regime, but we must not lose sight of the theme in the contemporary world: bureaucratic-authoritarianism, especially as a result of the limits the rate at which the system (It is assumed to maintain the rhythm of the system collapses. From the rated, others must forego benefits—a share to workers. Sectors which the formerly sacrosanct force. Force becomes a conserve what they fear theirs. Moreover, this countries which seem to which economic growth policies of importation corresponded stronger, more demanding proletariat demand for these benefits to be economic "elbow room," consumption. Thus, in the long run generates the authoritarian state arises, although the traditional, nineteenth-century (temperate one) in the

According to this Chile was almost inevitable to block construction regardless of Chile. Perhaps the U.S. *coup's* arrival, but it was defective social structure necessary to satisfy a class. During the 1960s

neglect the errors (or successes) of the political leadership of the government and the opposition in using their respective strengths.

It is tempting to use this line of analysis to explain the present Chilean regime, but we should not ignore another very influential theme in the contemporary literature.³ This is the argument that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America emerge basically as a result of the rigidity of social structures. This rigidity limits the rate at which new sectors, struggling to obtain a larger portion of the benefits of development, can be incorporated into the system. (It is assumed, of course, that development is occurring or has occurred.) A time comes when it is no longer possible to maintain the rhythm of incorporation, and at this point the system collapses. From that moment, if new sectors are to be incorporated, others must forego or at least decrease their share of the benefits—a share to which they have been accustomed for generations. Sectors which face losing ground then begin to ignore the formerly sacrosanct rules and resort to solutions based on force. Force becomes a means by which privileged groups seek to conserve what they fear losing, what they feel is legitimately theirs. Moreover, this phenomenon occurs precisely in those countries which seem the most advanced in the region—those in which economic growth (in many cases initiated by industrialization policies of import-substitution during the 1930s) has generated corresponding social growth in the sense of the emergence of stronger, more demanding social classes. An ever stronger industrial proletariat demands and obtains greater benefits. However, for these benefits to be distributed, there must be sufficient economic “elbow room,” room for both more investment and more consumption. Thus, according to this theory, development in the long run generates the end of the democratic system. The authoritarian state arises, although certainly in a form far different from the traditional, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century dictatorships that still exist in some tropical countries (and more than one temperate one) in the region.

According to this interpretation, again, what happened in Chile was almost inevitable. The military *coup* did not take place just to block construction of a socialist state; it would have occurred regardless of the kind of civilian government ruling in Chile. Perhaps the *Unidad Popular* experience accelerated the *coup*'s arrival, but it would have taken place anyway, since Chile's defective social structure impeded the rapid economic growth necessary to satisfy an ever larger and more demanding working class. During the 1960s the peasants had registered to vote in

which these groups expressed themselves. The options open to each of the contending political forces and the various ways in which the struggle developed are analyzed in detail. Tapia describes clearly how, as the contenders became radicalized, the traditional arenas for resolving conflicts in a society based on a state of law (e.g., the National Congress) gave way to others, forming the basis of a society of conflict (factories, farms, universities, unions, etc.). Similarly, the various social and economic interests that in normal times delegated power through mechanisms of representation (e.g., political parties) now took power into their own hands, refusing to act through intermediaries. In other words, the confrontation of social classes in Chile began to occur directly, without intervening structures capable of mediating the intensity of the conflict. Tapia Videla suggests that recognition of this step, by which a political system of conciliation moved toward one of confrontation, is crucial to understanding what occurred.

The essay by Sergio Bitar is more than a mere description of the economic aspects of the *Unidad Popular* government. It is also an analysis of the interaction of economic and political factors. The author argues that two elements must be adequately understood by those wishing to move an economy toward socialism. First, it is necessary to study carefully the rhythm and velocity that modifications in the economic structure should assume. There will inevitably be a temporal lag between the implementation of economic changes and their impact on the correlation of forces in the political arena. A profound change in a given economic structure can produce the desired political effects only after the diverse participants in the productive process have adapted to the new situation. Moreover, the short-term effects produced by the changes may be diametrically opposed to those which are sought. This lag must be taken into account by those who wish to introduce profound changes in a society's economic structure.

The second element, closely linked to the first, concerns the compatibility of long-term structural changes with short-term economic policies designed to resolve immediate problems. The dilemma seems to involve difficult choices with obvious political consequences. Bitar uses these two elements to analyze the various economic disequilibria which were produced during the Allende administration. Finally, he offers a number of hypotheses about the conduct of specific social classes when confronted by various economic policies.

Clodomiro Almeyda describes Chilean foreign relations during the Allende period. His essay analyzes in detail the theoretical

The commentaries which follow these five essays are observations, subsequently revised by their authors, on the papers presented at Chapel Hill. In the majority, only stylistic and editorial changes have been made. Hence, their tone is frequently colloquial. We sought purposely to maintain the spontaneity of the commentators' reactions.

In Part Two (Causes of the Outcome), there are two basic documents. In the first, Radomiro Tomić, after reviewing Chilean development prior to 1970, undertakes to weigh those factors that, at the beginning of the Allende administration, favored and hindered its chances for success. For Tomić, the basic reason for Allende's failure was the fact that the government never defined its final objective. Was the "second road to socialism" to lead to an entirely new socialist model? Or was it simply a different means of reaching one of the existing models, those which we know exist today in the various countries where socialism has been implanted? According to Tomić, both affirmations could be found within the *Unidad Popular*, and this ideological confusion was its fatal weakness.

A second fundamental cause of Allende's failure, notes Tomić, was the government's decision not to expand its social base. Specifically, it failed to reach a political agreement with the Christian Democratic party, particularly at the beginning of Allende's administration, when the most progressive sectors—in Tomić's opinion—controlled the party. Without entering into an analysis of who was responsible for the failure to reach an understanding, it is worth emphasizing that there was a generally shared belief in the seminar discussions that such an understanding would have greatly improved the experiment's chances for success. In these discussions, many events that affected relations between the Christian Democrats and the *Unidad Popular* were elucidated.

Luis Maira prefers not to speak of causes but of "different scenarios" in which the various social and economic forces confronted and clashed with one another. In his opinion, five such scenarios can be distinguished: political institutions, political leadership, the economy, the military, and the international arena. For Maira, these do not form isolated compartments, but are closely interwoven and overlapping. The *coup* cannot be explained by any one alone, but the interaction of the five does explain the events leading to September 11. In his essay, Maira focuses entirely on the first scenario, studying the manner in which the opposition slowly chipped away at the power of the presidency. In essence, his argument emphasizes two points: a)

into a unified political organization. More specifically, the requisite of a majority is fulfilled only when it is present in organized form." For many observers, this lack of unified, organic leadership was the principal cause of failure.

Silva Solar's and Tomić's commentaries help to clarify the tortuous road the government had to traverse if it wanted a dialogue with the Christian Democrats. Tapia Valdés' version of why the conversations failed in one specific case may be one-sided, but the delicacy of the subject matter reveals the difficulties of negotiating. It is far easier to search for conciliation within a given political or economic system than to reach agreements on its modification, albeit partial. From the perspective of those seeking less radical change, an error in evaluation by the *Unidad Popular* might constitute the point of no return. This anxiety was always present in the negotiations. What guarantee could be offered that an agreement would not mean the end of the very system that permitted the various interests to negotiate in the first place?

The discussion which followed these papers was at times heated and often exciting. Unfortunately, lack of space has prevented us from including it here. In general, it dealt with many of the same points. The question of who was responsible for the rupture between the government and the Christian Democrats occupied much of the debate. Yet other topics were also suggested for consideration: the degree of uniqueness of the Chilean case, the left's lack of technical preparation—in contrast to 1964—for its electoral victory, the absence of any real knowledge of military attitudes, etc.

Part Three contains analyses of more general topics relating to the Chilean experience. Schmitter and Stern both examine the repercussions of what happened in Chile on other areas, particularly in "Latin" Europe. Soares, in his essay, considers other models, such as Brazil, which now seem to serve as a guide to the Chilean *junta*. Bulé, in his essay, and Nun in his commentary, focus on the specific characteristics of the authoritarian states emerging on the continent. Finally, Landsberger and Linz compare the Chilean tragedy with that of the Spanish Republic. Their article offers a vision of the past, surprising in the similarity of both the problems faced and the form of their resolution.

In reviewing the results of our efforts, we editors find that we have overlooked many topics. The reader may note others. The distance between goals and achievements is all too often great, and we fear that this may be the case here.

The first and most obvious omission is that of any systematic

analysis of the military, whether referring to Chile in particular or to Latin America in general. Although it is true that, with respect to the latter, the recent literature is relatively abundant⁵ (particularly when compared with the situation prior to 1960), as far as Chile is concerned it is still very scarce. It seems that the long-established reputation of the Chilean armed forces as "professional and nonpolitical" made social scientists feel it would be uninteresting to study them in depth. Thus, virtually nothing has been written, except for the work by Joxe,⁶ a doctoral dissertation,⁷ and a study of the motives for the 1925 military intervention.⁸ None of these sheds much light on the present phenomenon. Certainly more will be written in the future. Our desire was to have initiated this discussion—which will be long and emotionally charged—with some original work. Unfortunately, we were unable to find anyone with the time and/or the expertise to undertake such an exercise. We sought someone who could have replied to such elemental questions as why regimes of this type—all very similar in their basic characteristics—are emerging throughout Latin America. Why do the armed forces, who—to define them negatively—do not form part of the oligarchies or highest income sectors, nevertheless, once in power, adopt policies that serve these minorities? Or, to reverse the coin, how do oligarchies manage to "sell" the vision that they are the depositories and sole defenders of the "Western and Christian" world, when in fact this position is a transparent defense of their privileges? To reply that the "military are the iron fist of the bourgeoisie" seems hardly more than a slogan. The answer is much more complex, and when it is found, we will have advanced considerably in our understanding of the phenomenon. It will undoubtedly include as an important element, or at least one worthy of mention, the training of these armed forces in the United States. (It is curious, however, that many important North American values—e.g., those referring to human rights, basic liberties, the electoral systems, etc.—do not seem to be "transmitted" with the same efficacy as others—e.g., the benefits of the capitalist system and "free enterprise.") On the other hand, to say that one is dealing in many cases with "middle class military coups"⁹ seems, given the policies now pursued, to dwell in the past. In the Chile of today this thesis would be very difficult to defend.

Our examination of the military would also have had to study the appropriateness of specific policies of the *Unidad Popular* concerning its relations with the armed forces. Luis Maira touches on this topic only in passing, despite the fact that he considers it one of the five scenarios that explain the outcome of September 11. Nev-

ertheless, our knowledge is a major omission.

Although it appears that the antagonist is the Central Intelligence Agency, the role of the CIA's role in the important reports—the States Senate—appears to be included.¹⁰ In April, 1973, published in the press, his famous press conference in the United States had initiated a wave of opposition newspapers and political opposition papers of the "best interest of the moral issues implied by the activities of the United States." The *Unidad Popular* discussions stated, "I would have had to defend this intervention had I known its true dimensions, it is worth emphasizing that we do not exaggerate that intervention was not the determining factor, a combination of factors, among them, the most important. This, of course, is not the intervention nor its focus, but where so many "sacred" values are at stake on a broader level, in relation to the continent." Another closely related issue in passing is that of the "impossible blockade" by the "Allende Doctrine" in Chile. As mentioned, it is considered as an element determining the outcome of the *Unidad Popular*. This is not a result from the conviction that the blockade and its character that some would explain many problems caused by the strangulation of the country. An overwhelming importance we should conclude that

ertheless, our knowledge is still very insufficient, and this is a major omission.

Although it appears fleetingly, another virtually absent protagonist is the Central Intelligence Agency. The definitive history of the CIA's role in the Chilean tragedy is still to be written. Two important reports—the result of investigations by the United States Senate—appeared some time after our seminar had concluded.¹⁰ In April, 1975, we knew no more than what had been published in the press and what President Ford had admitted in his famous press conference of September 16, 1974—that the United States had intervened to “help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve political opposition parties.” All this had been done in the name of the “best interest of the people of Chile.”¹¹ Without discussing the moral issues implicit in this declaration, it seems clear that the activities of the United States were no surprise to the leaders of the *Unidad Popular* government. As one of them present at our discussions stated, “It was something with which any analysis would have had to deal.” Determining the degree of importance this intervention had in the final outcome (assuming that someday we know its true dimensions) will be a difficult task. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that no one at the seminar sought to exaggerate that intervention: it contributed to the outcome, but it was not the determining cause. The *coup* was produced by a combination of factors, among which internal elements were most important. This, of course, does not lessen the seriousness of that intervention nor its future implications, whether within Chile, where so many “sacred” images have been destroyed, or, on a broader level, in relations between Chile and the United States.

Another closely related topic that is absent or referred to only in passing is that of imperialism or, more specifically, the “invisible blockade” by the United States. Although the impact of the “Allende Doctrine” in relations with the United States is mentioned, it is considered less in the context of those relations than as an element determined by the internal politics of the *Unidad Popular*. This is not an inadvertent oversight; to some extent, it results from the conviction, shared by the conference participants, that the blockade and similar actions did not have the decisive character that some would attribute to them. They did occur and can explain many problems (particularly the economic difficulties caused by the strangulation of foreign trade), but they were not of overwhelming importance. As with the CIA, this does not mean we should conclude that they need not be mentioned or, as some

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have maintained, did not exist. For our purposes, it seemed more important to focus discussion on those problems that could be affected by the action of Chileans and to analyze the barriers facing any society attempting to move toward socialism. The invisible (or, as in Cuba, visible) blockade would be one of these and hence deserves consideration. But to devote space and time to quantifying the importance of the blockade might have proved less rewarding than to examine any of the other topics with which we dealt. To the extent that the blockade was considered, it would have been more useful to focus discussion on how to confront such challenges.

Another theme that is not clearly treated concerns the "uniqueness" of the Chilean experience. The entire book assumes that the reader has considerable knowledge about Chile. Starting from this premise, we do not indicate what is unique to the complexities of the Chilean situation. Through 1970 Chile had a long history of solid and mature political institutions, an advanced level of social development compared to the rest of Latin America, powerful workers' organizations with clear ideological bases, and well-established, doctrinaire political parties (we refer to the major parties). These and other elements, too numerous to list, attest to Chile's uniqueness, and we assume that these peculiar traits are well known. Moreover, they explain many of the problems treated in the following pages. For example, when participants discuss at length the inability of the left to build a unified political structure, they affirm an almost self-evident fact. One has to know the history of each of the parties to understand how difficult it was for the *Unidad Popular* to move from theory to practice—a fact not discussed by any of our participants, despite the urgent need for just such a discussion.

Permeating all the events of the fateful years from 1970 to 1973, and the many questions they raise, is Salvador Allende himself, who adds an important element of uniqueness to the Chilean case. No one analyzed the role played in the Chilean process by the personality of its leader, so here, too, an important problem is overlooked. It is true that the *Unidad Popular* was characterized by the importance (perhaps too great) of the political parties within the government, which limited the influence of individuals charged with implementing policies. Nevertheless, it is very clear that Allende played a key role in the Chilean left. It was he who persevered in advancing the idea of the *Unidad Popular* (previously known as the Front for Popular Action, or FRAP)¹²—a coalition that would bring together the various sectors of the Chilean

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Although the o Chilean case is sor analyze its impact difficult, and we a obtained. The essa rope interpreted the experience actually litical processes. (I tions of the Italian influenced, at leas often been noted th military defeat, cau tors. Perhaps we cisely as efforts to a ues especially dea Portuguese Sociali (thus moving to the Mario Soares refers the need for grea analysis such as th

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left and use the existing institutional mechanisms to gain control of the government. Allende maintained this position without vacillation, often in the face of opposition within his own party and from other political groups who felt that power could not be obtained through an institutional strategy. We do not intend to present here a history of political positions. Allende's favored line for his party was defeated in any number of Socialist congresses. Thus, although social processes cannot be explained entirely by the individuals who intervene in them, one can still say that to a large extent the *Unidad Popular* was the fruit of Allende's perseverance. Its creation as the political expression of Chilean workers reflected much more than the will of one man, but we cannot deny the importance of his role. For these reasons, it is difficult to understand why Allende, once he became President, had such difficulty transforming a political combination, so useful for obtaining electoral victory, into a government apparatus capable of unified policymaking. One reason is that his exaggerated respect for the desires of the individual coalition parties impeded every effort toward unity. One could go on proposing hypotheses about the role of Allende's presidency in the Chilean experience, but suffice it to say that this is another element we did not examine closely.

Although the organizers of the conference were aware that the Chilean case is somewhat unique, it was decided nevertheless to analyze its impact on other regions and environments. This was difficult, and we are only partially satisfied with the results we obtained. The essays here are directed more to studying how Europe interpreted the Chilean experience than to observing how this experience actually influenced the development of European political processes. (To what extent, for example, are the new positions of the Italian and French Communist parties, if not strongly influenced, at least colored by what happened in Chile?) It has often been noted that the Chilean failure was more a political than a military defeat, caused by the loss of support of the "middle sectors." Perhaps we can interpret the new European policies precisely as efforts to avoid such a situation by preserving certain values especially dear to these sectors. Is it true that each time the Portuguese Socialist party moves its position nearer to the center (thus moving to the right) it bears in mind the Chilean experience? Mario Soares refers to Chile constantly, particularly in emphasizing the need for greater discipline in economic productivity. Here an analysis such as that outlined above could have been useful.

Finally, in our enumeration of what this book is not, we must

point out that it is not an evaluation of the Chilean experience. We never intended to review the accomplishments and failures of government policy during the *Unidad Popular's* three years in Chile. This book does not contain statistics on the economic sector: production, growth in GNP, distribution of income, employment, balance of payments, etc., except where these are necessary to support a particular argument. Nor do we analyze what occurred in education, health, or basic services, etc. On the one hand, the *Unidad Popular* is too recent a phenomenon to make such an evaluation feasible or to permit comparison of the Allende administration with previous governments. On the other, the distorted use of statistics by the present rulers makes such a task very difficult. The various essays in this volume seek to elucidate something considered more essential—the viability of the experiment as a whole—than measuring each success or failure of the *Unidad Popular* by the traditional indicators. Such measuring is more appropriate for a government that rules within a given system; in Chile, where the challenge was to change the system, it is essential to “measure” whether the road chosen to accomplish that change was adequate and whether the experience can serve as a model for other societies. This is what we have sought to do.

It is perhaps important to add a few final comments. The visions presented here of what happened in Chile reflect a wide spectrum of Chilean society and diverse ideological and political positions. Nevertheless, any reader familiar with Chile will notice that some positions are not represented. The organizers were aware of this from the beginning, but the opportunities for a fruitful exchange of ideas were only possible within a limited segment of the ideological rainbow. We reluctantly came to the conclusion that if we attempted to include the entire spectrum, the possibilities for dialogue would be practically nil. Those actors who, during the three years of the *Unidad Popular* government, preached the defense of democracy, and who today make a mockery of it, showing that they do not believe in the rules of the game they established and claimed to defend, could not easily be invited to participate in a discussion of the Chilean experience. The dialogue with those sectors of Chilean society has been lost, perhaps forever. There is only hope that new generations will be able to renew it. On the other hand, we must also admit that, though the point of view of what is generally known as the “revolutionary left” is occasionally reflected in some of the essays, none of the participants truly represented that current of thought. In addition, it must be recognized that what happened in Chile stirs deep

emotions. It is difficult to feel that we have

As always has been the moment some of the actors” and social participation would be the military justifiable contributions not be included in

To conclude, the week of exchange had been fully capable of discussions. We know that Chile we once knew

We know that they differ from the old that small nations will again prevail.

NOTES

1. Salvador Allende (1971).

2. By way of examples: Jirina Rybicka, *Cal Survey* (mimeographed); *Union List of Chilean* attempt to order authors) the most important Valenzuela, “Visión” (Fall 1975), pp. 155-156.

3. On this point, see *Prismo* (Buenos Aires) articles of that author and Faletto on Chile, José

4. Since, inevitably necessary to indicate the orderly presentation of what happened, many failures

emotions. It is difficult to maintain the calm and academic objectivity necessary for analysis. We do not believe it overly optimistic to feel that we have achieved some degree of success.

As always happens in conferences of this kind, at the last moment some of the participants originally on the program were unable to appear. This was the case for Clodomiro Almeyda, Pío García, Gabriel Valdés, Joseph Grunwald, and also of a number of "actors" and social scientists who still live in Chile, for whom participation would have meant exposing themselves to reprisals by the military *junta*. Some of these Chilean scholars sent valuable contributions, which, except for the chapter by P. Bulé, could not be included in the limited space of this volume.

To conclude, the peaceful atmosphere of Chapel Hill and the privacy of the meetings permitted us to have a very rewarding week of exchanging ideas. Needless to say, the editors have not been fully capable of capturing herein every dimension of the discussions. We add only that during that week we relived the Chile we once knew, a Chile which today is dead.

We know that, when it is reborn tomorrow, the new Chile will differ from the old; we hope that the enduring values which made that small nation so civilized, so open, and such a lover of freedom will again prevail.

NOTES

1. Salvador Allende, *Primer Mensaje al Congreso Nacional* (May 21, 1971).

2. By way of example, there are already two attempts to compile bibliographies: Jirina Rybacek-Mlynkova, *Chile under Allende: A Bibliographical Survey* (mimeograph, n/d); and Eli Williams, *The Allende Years: A Union List of Chilean Imprints* (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1976). For an attempt to order and classify (by the ideological orientation of their authors) the most important publications, see Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Visions of Chile," *Latin American Research Review* 10, 3(Fall 1975), pp. 155-175.

3. On this point, see Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernización y Autoritarismo* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1972), and in general all the writings of that author and of Fernando Henrique Cardoso on Brazil, Enzo Faletto on Chile, Jose Luis Reyna on Mexico, etc.

4. Since, inevitably, all four themes are discussed as a whole, it is hardly necessary to indicate that this division is made only to facilitate the orderly presentation of the essays. For example, in the papers describing what happened, many comments point directly to the "causes" of later failure.

5. See the summary of this literature presented by Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," *World Politics* 27, 1 (October 1974), pp. 107-130.

6. Alain Joxe, *Las Fuerzas Armadas en el Sistema Político Chileno* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970).

7. Bory A. Hansen, "Military Culture and Organizational Decline: A Study of the Chilean Army" (Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1967).

8. Frederick M. Nunn, *Chilean Politics, 1920-1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces* (Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1970); *The Military in Chilean History: Essay on Civil-Military Relations, 1810-1973* (Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1976).

9. This thesis, advanced by Joxe, was first formulated by José Nun in a study of *coups* from 1920 to 1930 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, etc. See José Nun, "The Middle Class Military Coup," in Claudio Véliz (ed.), *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967).

10. U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 940465, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975); and U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973: Staff Report to the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).

11. *New York Times*, September 17, 1974, p. 22.

12. In 1952 Allende was the presidential candidate of the People's Front, a combination including the Communist party and a faction of the Socialists. In 1958 and 1964 his candidacy was supported by the Front for Popular Action (FRAP), a coalition of the Communist and Socialist parties (the latter having been reunited in 1956) and other minor groups. The *Unidad Popular* added to these the Radical party and Christian groups (the MAPU) that had abandoned the Christian Democratic party in 1969.

The Three A An Overview