

FRIDA:

SACAR Copin HOYA

PAPA Inv. M. v. Osero

Political Attitudes and Behavior  
of the Chilean Working-Class, 1958-1968

by

José Luis Rodríguez

and

Brian H. Smith

Professors Linz and Dogan  
Department of Sociology  
Yale University

May 19, 1972

Comparative research on the political behavior and attitudinal patterns of workers in Latin America has been an underdeveloped (and all too often misdeveloped) area of study and remains so to the present. In only two countries, Cuba and Chile, has there been systematic research on working-class political behavior patterns.<sup>1</sup>

Research on the Chilean working-class has been particularly intensive in the past 10 years. Analyses have been based almost entirely on ecological data as there are very few opinion surveys available, and the ones that do exist have not been directed specifically at the working-class but at the class structure as a whole with the workers often undersampled.

There are two major assertions in the literature regarding Chilean working-class political behavior. The first is that the working class is the core element of support for the leftist parties and that consequently workers hold a strategic position in the political system.<sup>2</sup> The second assertion is that the workers are a cohesive force which can be mobilized by the left for political and social struggles.<sup>3</sup> Our analysis will focus on these two arguments and test them both for their empirical validity.

Much of the research to date is unsatisfactory because it fails to go beyond the manifest patterns in the data to the more subtle analysis of behavior and attitudes of different occupational groups within the working-class. Political and class cleavages are often glossed over in the effort to show that workers as a group are predominantly this or that.

For example, although it is true that workers in Chile often identify with the political Left, it is also true, as we shall soon show, that substantial numbers choose the Right and many make no choice at all. In addition, differential behavior and attitudinal patterns appear between industrial and non-industrial (service) workers and between men and women in working-class families. Thus, things are not as clear-cut as we are often led to believe by the existing literature.

This part of the paper addresses itself to the following theoretical question: Is there a relationship between political attitudes and socio-economic status for the working-class, and if so, does this result in cohesive class-conscious political behavior? Specifically, we wish to determine the political tendencies of workers, with which political parties they identify, which candidates they choose, and what their impact is on electoral politics. Indeed, we wish to determine to what degree political behavior reflects class-conscious motivation.

Our comments shall be based on a 1958 random sample of Santiago's population taken by the University of California at Berkeley Survey Research Center just prior to the Presidential elections. A number of political attitude questions were asked, along with questions on vote intention and political party affiliation. We shall also employ some ecological data for purposes of comparison and empirical testing of survey findings and actual electoral results.

In the 1958 election for President of Chile, Jorge Alessandri of the Liberal-Conservative coalition and Salvador Allende of the FRAP, a left-wing coalition of several parties (including Communists and Socialists), were the major contenders. Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democrats, Luis Bossay of the Radical Party and Antonio Zamarano Herrera, an ultra-leftist defrocked priest were also on the ballot. Only 3.7 percentage points separated the two major candidates. (See Table 1)

Table 1: National Results of the 1958 Presidential Elections

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Jorge Alessandri	Conservative/ Liberal	389,909	31.6
Salvador Allende	FRAP	356,493	28.9
Antonio Zamarano	---	41,304	3.3
Eduardo Frei	Christian-Dem.	255,769	20.7
Luis Bossay	Radicals	192,077	15.5
			100.0

} 397,797 } 32.2

2  
1

It is interesting to note that if it had not been for Zamarano's last-minute splinter candidacy, Salvador Allende would have won the election by about 8,000 votes. Zamarano obtained most of his vote from miners in the northern provinces, the stronghold of the left. Thus it is valid to assume that these voters would have supported Allende if Zamarano had not been on the ballot.<sup>4</sup> The Chilean "socialist" experiment could thus have been initiated 12 years earlier to the present attempt, although the likelihood of its having survived U.S.



political and military pressure in those "cold war" years seem, in retrospect, almost non-existent.

The campaign dwelt largely on economic issues with fairly defined positions among the parties. "The FRAP campaign attacked the wage freeze, the austerity program, and foreign investment, and supported welfare measures,"<sup>5</sup> and proposed a program for nationalization of industry and redistribution of land and wealth. The Conservative-Liberal coalition, in contrast, pushed austerity with paternalism, and eagerly wooed foreign investment to help revitalize the sagging and unstable Chilean economy. The Christian Democrats, a moderate reformist party with no formal ties to the Church, campaigned on a platform of social welfare measures for the lower classes and rapid industrial development with a large degree of State involvement. The Radical Party had a position similar to that of the conservative coalition but with less emphasis on austerity. Chilean voters were thus given the opportunity to choose among candidates of different political and ideological orientations.

The 1958 pre-election survey provides us with an opportunity to deal with a good many questions of broad interest in political sociology. Some of these questions have already been raised. Others will appear as we proceed.

The 807 respondents were asked to name the political party to which they were affiliated or which came closest to their political beliefs. Of these, 539 named one of 7 political parties. Thus, a third of those interviewed did not answer this question. The distribution of "no answers" among the various occupational categories is slightly skewed towards

the last four groups (i.e., the working class. We shall have occasion at a later point in the paper to discuss the significance of the non-respondents.

Table 2 shows the distribution of political party sympathizers by social class. cursory inspection of this table shows interesting patterns among groups and within social classes. Thus, for example, we find that among middle-level employees, managers, and professors, over 50% identify with Center parties, while small businessmen, also members of the middle strata of society, choose the conservatives.

Table 2 : Social Classes and Political Party  
Identification in Santiago, Chile  
1958

Occupation	RIGHT		CENTER			LEFT		%	N
	Cons.	Libs.	Rad.	CD	Ag. Lab.	Soc.	Comm.		
Large Buss.	38.4	38.4	7.6	--	--	7.6	7.6	100	13
Managers/ Professors	9.6	26.9	19.2	30.7	--	11.5	1.9	100	52
Small Buss.	23.8	35.7	11.9	19.0	4.7	4.7	--	100	42
Middle-Level Employees	15.4	16.0	24.7	26.5	1.8	11.7	3.7	100	162
Independent Workers	21.1	19.5	24.5	17.8	2.5	9.3	5.0	100	118
Skilled Workers	9.6	14.5	14.5	20.9	3.2	24.2	12.9	100	62
Unskilled Workers	15.0	9.6	10.9	20.5	--	30.1	13.7	100	73
Domestics	23.5	17.6	17.6	29.4	11.7	--	--	100	17

Total N = 539

The groups we wish to focus on are the last four occupational categories. The skilled and unskilled workers are predominantly factory and construction workers, while the domestics and independents are non-industrial workers. (These latter include street-vendors, gardeners, floor-waxers, "junk" men, and a multitude of other odd-job occupations which are essentially of a service nature.) The four groups combined form our working-class subsample (N=417). To these workers we now turn.

Table-3: Political Cleavage of the Working-Class in Santiago, Chile

<u>All Social Classes</u>	<u>Political Parties</u>	<u>Working-Class Subsample</u>	
(N= 539)		(N=270)	
%		%	
5.9 } 20	Communists	8.9 }	26.7
14.1 }	Socialists	17.8 }	
24.7 }	CD / Ag. Lab.	22.6 }	
19.5 }	Radicals	18.1 }	
35.8 }	Conservatives/Liberals	32.6 }	
<u>100.00</u>	No answer: 147	<u>100.00</u>	
		<u>Industrial</u>	<u>Non-Industrial</u>
		N=135	N=135
	Communists	13.3 }	4.4 }
	Socialists	27.4 }	8.1 }
	CD / Ag. Lab.	22.2 }	23.0 }
	Radicals	12.6 }	23.7 }
	Conservatives/Liberals	24.4 }	40.7 }
		<u>100.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>
		No ans.: 74	No ans.: 73
		<u>Ind.</u>	<u>Non-Ind.</u>
% of workers among the .....	Communists (N=32)	75.0	18.8
	Socialists (N=76)	63.1	14.5
	CD / Ag. Lab. (N=123)	49.6	25.2
	Radicals (N=105)	46.7	30.5
	Conservatives/Liberals (N=193)	45.6	28.5

In Table 3 the political cleavage of the working-class is clearly apparent. Looking at the combined figures first, we find that a plurality of workers (32.6%) identify with parties of the Right, with only 26.7% indicating support of parties of the Left. Forty percent of those who expressed political party affiliation or closeness choose the Center parties (i.e., Christian Democrats and Radicals). Thus, at this aggregate level, we find no supporting evidence for the claim that the Chilean working-class identifies with the Left. In fact, the opposite is the case -- 73.3% of them choose non-leftist parties. In addition, only 270 of the 417 workers actually expressed a preference for a party. 147 do not answer this question -- 35.3% of the subsample/ <sup>while</sup> this information indicates that with regard to political parties many workers have not made up their minds or else ignore the question altogether. Not only does a plurality identify with the Right, but a significant proportion are not even moved to state a preference.

When we disaggregate the subsample into industrial (N=135) and non-industrial (N=135) workers, interesting results are obtained. Among industrial workers, 40.7% identify with the Left parties (the large majority of them choosing the Socialist Party over the Communist), while among the non-industrial workers only 12.5% do so. Thus, a definite cleavage appears between these two groups -- a plurality of industrial workers are leftist sympathizers, while a plurality of non-industrial workers are rightist sympathizers. Almost a quarter of the industrial workers, however, (24.4%) express support for the Right. With respect to those who give no answer, there

is about an equal number in each occupational category of workers.

The results thus far generated indicate that at least with respect to political party support, one should exercise caution in discussions about workers. The student must specify which group of workers he is dealing with and recognize the cleavages that do exist as well as the high degree of undecidedness among all workers.

The data at the bottom of Table 3 does support the claims of many that the predominant core of the Socialist and Communist parties resides in the working-class. <sup>Seventy-five percent</sup> of Communists in the sample come from the working-class. However, it is clear that three-quarters of them are industrial workers. 63.1% of the 76 Socialists in the sample are workers, but again over three-quarters of this group are industrials. Thus, we have found that the industrial workers are the core element of support for the leftist parties, and not the working-class as a whole. Diagrams 1 and 2 illustrate the class structure of the Communist and Socialist parties.

The figures at the bottom of Table 3 also indicate that nearly half of the support for the conservative coalition and for the center coalition comes from the working class, the non-industrials again being much farther to the right compared to the industrials. This indicates a strong cleavage in the working-class and the potential the workers offer to the Center and Conservative parties -- they are not readily mobilizable as a class for the Left.



Diagram 1: Social Structure of Communist Party  
(N=32)





Diagram 2: Social Structure of Socialist Party  
(N=76)



The respondents in the survey were also asked if they identified certain issues crucial to the Chilean economy with any of the major parties. Between 1950-1958 the per capita GNP growth rate was less than one percent. Inflation totaled nearly 100% during the eight year period and wages had stagnated after 1955. Food production was on the decline in Chile, and re-distribution of land was being publicly debated by the parties as a solution. As indicated earlier in the paper, the campaign centered on economic issues and topics such as wages for the working-class, cost of living, price control, and agrarian reform were aired during the pre-election period. Both the Communist and Socialist parties had taken strong positions favoring the use of public power to promote the interests of the agrarian poor and the urban workers.

It is significant, however, to see in Table 4 that none of the workers -- neither industrials nor non-industrials -- identify any of these key issues with the two parties of the Left. On the average, over three-quarters or more of the workers in both groups feel these major economic issues pertaining to their own/<sup>class</sup> interests are not goals of the leftist parties.

It is understandable why the workers do not associate either of the two Center parties or the two parties of the Right with promoting any of these goals, since none of these four parties had proposed them as solutions. The fact that the workers do not associate these issues with the Communists or Socialists is, however, very surprising and reveals the fact that these two parties are not attracting worker loyalties on the basis of the substance of their platforms.

Table 4: Identification of Issues with Parties by WorkersIndustrial Workers (N=209)

	Com.	Soc.	C.D.	Rad.	Lib.	Conserv.
Higher Wages	20% (42)	24.4% (51)	6.2% (13)	8.1% (17)	12.9% (27)	8.6% (18)
Lower Cost of Living	19% (40)	22% (46)	8.1% (17)	8.1% (17)	9.1% (19)	9.6% (20)
Govt. Price Control	11.5% (24)	14.8% (31)	4.8% (10)	4.8% (10)	7.2% (15)	3.3% (7)
Agrarian Reform	14.4% (30)	20% (42)	5.3% (11)	4.3% (9)	2.9% (6)	3.3% (7)
Average	16.3%	20.1%	6.1%	6.4%	8.0%	6.2%

Non-industrial Workers (N=208)

	Com.	Soc.	C.D.	Rad.	Lib.	Conserv.
Higher Wages	14.4% (30)	14.9% (31)	10.1% (21)	10.1% (21)	12% (25)	10.6% (22)
Lower Cost of Living	12% (25)	15.9% (33)	11.5% (24)	9.1% (19)	10.6% (22)	9.1% (19)
Govt. Price Control	6.7% (14)	9.1% (19)	3.8% (8)	9.1% (19)	6.7% (14)	7.2% (15)
Agrarian Reform	10.1% (21)	13% (27)	4.8% (10)	6.2% (13)	5.3% (11)	2.9% (6)
Average	10.8%	13.3%	7.6%	8.7%	8.7%	7.5%

Respondents were asked to indicate their support for a presidential candidate. This data is presented in Table 5 along with results on party identification.

Table 5 : Political Cleavage of the Working Class  
by Candidate Choice and Party Identification

<u>Candidate Choice</u>	<u>All Workers</u>	<u>Industrial</u>	<u>Non-industrial</u>
S. Allende	36.5% (122)	49.1% (81)	24.3% (41)
E. Frei	16.5% (55)	17.6% (29)	15.4% (26)
L. Bossay	8.7% (29)	4.8% (8)	12.4% (21)
J. Alessandri	38.3% (128)	28.5% (47)	47.9% (81)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100.0% (334)	100.0% (165)	100.0% (169)
	No ans.: 83	No ans.: 44	No ans.: 39

<u>Party Choice</u>	<u>All Workers</u>	<u>Industrial</u>	<u>Non-industrial</u>
Communist/Socialist	26.7% (72)	40.7% (55)	12.5% (17)
Christ. Dem./Ag. Lab.	22.6% (61)	22.2% (30)	23.0% (31)
Radical	18.1% (49)	12.6% (17)	23.7% (32)
Conserv./Liberal	32.6% (88)	24.4% (33)	40.7% (55)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100.0% (270)	100.0% (135)	100.0% (135)
	No ans.: 147	No ans.: 74	No ans.: 73

A total of 334 of the 417 workers indicate a preference and about one-fifth give no answer. We notice immediately that the two major candidates attract many more people than do their respective parties and the inverse occurs for the other two candidates. Bossay, for example, loses about 45% of his party's supporters (49 to 29). In the case of the Radical party, the shift away from the party and its candidate may be a function of political strategy. Everyone knew the Radicals had no chance to win the election; thus, many supporters simply deserted the party at the polls. In fact, one of the results of the 1958 election was the virtual collapse of the Radical Party.

Allende gains most in the shift (26.7% to 36.5%), but Alessandri still holds an edge over him among all workers (38.3%). Both gain at the expense of the Center candidates and attract others previously unwilling to identify with a party. The congruence between party identification and candidate choice is sufficiently close so that if we were pressed to predict candidate choice from the data on party identification we could do so reasonably well. However, on the basis of party support alone it is difficult to gauge how much attractive power a candidate has vis-à-vis his party.

Allende is the preferred candidate among industrial workers (49.1%) over Alessandri (28.5%). The exact reverse occurs among the non-industrial workers; 47.9% choose Alessandri while only 24.3% choose Allende. However, it is interesting to note that in the shift from party to candidate, Alessandri gains only 4% among the industrial workers (from 24.4% to 28.5%), while Allende doubles his support among the




non-industrial workers (from 12.5% to 24.3%). In actual numbers, Allende gains 50 supporters while Alessandri gains 40.

We can conclude that among workers there is stronger support for the Left than is indicated by mere party identification, as well as stronger support for the Right. This underscores the previous findings above that party platforms are not appealing to workers' consciousness -- rather personality of the candidates is far more important.


In all cases the candidates of the Center parties lose support while the two major candidates gain. Thus, we are witnessing a bi-polarization of a previously multi-fragmented situation within the working-class as a whole -- i.e., there is an almost even split between the Left and Right candidates who capture three-quarters of the workers. Between the two occupational groupings inverse polarization occurs, so that the end results are almost the mirror images of one another. To enhance visual examination, the data from Table 5 is presented in Diagram 3.

Diagram 3 : Political Stratification of the Chilean Working-Class  
by Political Party Identification and Candidate Choice


Party Identification (270)




Candidate Choice (334)




Industrial Workers  
(135)




Industrial Workers  
(165)



Non-Industrial Workers  
(135)



Non-Industrial Workers  
(169)



In order to place Chile in comparative perspective with other countries which have a wide spectrum of parties and well organized Left, we have included Table 6 which compares the results of the Hamuy survey from Chile with some conjectural estimates of industrial working-class preferences in France and Italy constructed by Professor Mattei Dogan on the basis of ecological data.<sup>6</sup>

Table 6: Political Cleavage of the Industrial Working-Class: France, Italy, Chile

	France (1956)	Italy (1958)	Chile (1958)
Communists	49	38	} 49.1%
Socialists	17	29	
Christ.-Dems.	11	26	17.6
Conserv./Lib./Rad.	22	2	33.3
Extreme Right	1	5	0
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100.0
<u>% of workers among:</u>			
Communists	71%	55%	} 47%
Socialists	42	52	
Christ.-Dems	38	20	22
Conserv./Lib./Rad.	22	10	30
Extreme Right	4	19	0
TOTAL ELECTORATE	<hr/> 37.2	<hr/> 33.0	<hr/> 25.7

Since 1956 the Socialists and Communists in Chile have combined to support one candidate to represent the Left, whereas in France and Italy each party runs a separate man. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that the combined vote for the Communists and Socialists in France and Italy far exceeds the preference in Chile for the candidate representing these two parties.

In 1958 the Radical party in Chile was very close to the Conservatives and Liberals in proposed programs and soon after Alessandri's victory they joined the Conservative-Liberal parliamentary coalition. For this reason, they are included on the same line for comparative purposes with France and Italy. In 1958 all three of these parties in Chile were identified with business and upper-middle class interests.

The fact that less than half the Chilean workers preferred the Leftist candidate and a full third chose the Right is an indication of how polarized the industrial workers are in Chile when compared to the overwhelming Leftist orientation of the workers in France and Italy.

Thus far, the data suggests that there is a consistent relationship between political attitudes and work category. Specifically, we have found a strong correlation between industrial employment and leftist support and an inverse correlation between non-industrial work and support for the Left. In addition, we have found that among Chilean industrial workers there are fully a fourth who consistently choose the Right. The literature on the working-class in Chile has completely ignored this phenomenon, and therefore arguments about working-class radicalism in Chile must be re-validated in light of these findings.

In his study of French workers, Richard Hamilton has pointed to the frequent failure of those who write with a political bias to examine internal class cleavages:

Both the political right and left often lose sight of the problem of internal class cleavage. Marx argued that the dynamics of capitalist development would reduce all workers to a common level and contemporary spokesmen for the "center" argue the same dynamics will bring all workers up to a middle class level. Because of the focus on the long term ... the persistent short-run differences have been overlooked.<sup>7</sup>

We have found from analyzing the Hamuy data that such persistent differences do exist among the Chilean workers, and, in fact, this is not unlike similar patterns which exist among industrial workers of other countries.

Although the workers in Chile in 1958 appeared more polarized than their counterparts in France and Italy, nevertheless even in these and other European countries a significant proportion of industrial workers are attracted to what Gerhard Lenski has termed "capitalist ideology". In his survey of the literature on working-class political behavior in Western nations Lenski underscores this consistent tendency



among many industrial workers to select conservative political candidates:

In every nation where free elections are held, large numbers of working men support conservative or middle-of-the-road parties. In Britain, for example, public opinion polls show that the Conservative Party enjoys the support of a quarter to a third of the members of the working class. In the United States the Republican Party is supported by a third to a half of the working class, at least in Presidential elections. In West Germany in 1955 the working class was divided into three groups of almost equal size: (1) those supporting the Socialists, (2) those supporting center and right-wing parties, and (3) those without any party preference. In the French election in 1951, 30 percent of the working class voted for center or right-wing parties and 20 percent failed to vote. ...

The reasons for this are not hard to find. The schools and mass media are dominated by the propertied, entrepreneurial, and managerial classes, and while they permit a certain amount of criticism to be reported there, in the main these institutions are supportive of the system. Beyond this, however, these classes have proven willing to negotiate and make concessions, so that the conditions of life for the great majority of citizens have definitely improved.<sup>8</sup>

Although Chilean industrial workers do not enjoy the same standard of living as do workers in Europe or the United States they are relatively better off than several other sectors of Chilean society -- e.g., peasants and urban slum dwellers. They are also exposed to the same conservative influences of the media as in other Western industrial nations. In 1958 less than 10% of Chilean workers were unionized and many worked in small factories with daily face-to-face relationships with owners and managers. All these factors were at work to create persistent differences and cleavages among Chilean workers similar to those among workers of other industrial nations.

Ecological analysis of urban lower-income municipalities lends strength to our survey findings. Table 7 shows the percentages of industrial (secondary) and non-industrial (tertiary) employment and the ratio of Allende votes to Frei votes in the 1964 Presidential election.<sup>9</sup>

Table 7: Percentages of secondary and tertiary sector employment and ratios of Allende votes to Frei votes in 1964 in lower-income municipalities of Chile

Number of Allende Votes per 100 Frei Votes, 1964			Percent of Labor Force Employed in Tertiary Sector	Percent of Labor Force Employed in Secondary Sector
Men	Women	Municipality		
67	37	Santiago	68	31
91	51	Quilpúe	55	34
90	55	La Cisterna	53	45
96	57	Quinta Normal	53	44
92	53	Conchalí	51	46
104	64	Renca	50	46
114	69	San Miguel	48	51
122	77	Barrancas	46	42
129	80	La Granja	42	52
191	108	Penco	30	51
240	134	Tomé	29	50

We find that the greater the proportion of industrial workers in a municipality, the more likely it was for Allende to receive a high vote. Conversely, where a majority of the population was employed in tertiary activities (which in these communities involved such occupations as gardening, street cleaning, domestic services, and push-cart businesses), Allende did not do as well.

As the percent of tertiary employment decreases and industrial employment grows, Allende's vote relative to Frei's increases -- from 67 to 240 among the men, and from 37 to 134 among the women.

Attitudes on Four Questions Among Workers

Included in the survey were four questions on topics which were very crucial in late 1958 in Chile: the legal status of the Communist Party, land distribution, worker participation in management, and the raising of wages in order to increase production.

The Communist Party had been outlawed in Chile since 1948, but just prior to the September, 1958 elections it had been legally reinstated and had joined in a left-wing coalition supporting Salvador Allende for President. Respondents in this survey were asked if they favored freedom of action for the Communist Party on an equal basis with other political groups.

Respondents were also asked if they favored land distribution or aid to farm owners as alternate measures to increase food production. They were also asked whether workers should be given a greater voice in management decisions, and whether higher wages, as opposed to tax benefits for businessmen, would be an effective stimulus to production in a sagging economy.

None of these questions were related to candidates or parties, although debates during the campaign had centered on these issues and candidates had taken differing stances on them. The following table indicates the responses of the industrial and non-industrial workers to these four questions.

Table 8: Worker Attitudes on Four Questions

	<u>Industrials</u>	<u>Non-industrials</u>
Favor Legal Status of Communist Party	65.6% (124 of 189)	51.7% (92 of 178)
Favor Land Distribution	64.6% (124 of 192)	42.4% (81 of 191)
Favor Worker Participation in Management Decisions	68.5% (126 of 184)	61% (110 of 180)
Favor Higher Wages for Workers	80.6% (154 of 191)	68.8% (128 of 186)

On the first two questions regarding the legal status of the Communist Party and on land distribution, there are very wide differences between the industrial and non-industrial workers. The industrials are far more favorable to the Communist Party than are the non-industrials (65.6% to 51.7%). The industrial workers are more closely identified with the Communists and the Socialists as being the two parties which best represent their interests. The non-industrial workers, however, align themselves heavily with the Conservative and Liberal Parties and few associate themselves with the Communists. This is no doubt the reason why barely half of the non-industrials were favorable to allowing the Communists appear on the ballot.

There are also strong differences between these two groups on the question of land-distribution. The industrial workers identify much more closely with the peasants and their interests than do the non-industrials who are heavily influenced by the middle-classes whom they serve. The industrials favor land distribution by 64.6% but the non-industrials do so only by 42.4%.

When it comes to the two issues regarding worker participation in management and higher wages, the industrials are higher again in their support of these two issues than are the non-industrials, but they are closer together than on the other two questions. Over 60% of the non-industrials favor worker participation, and nearly 70% favor higher wages. The non-industrials do not associate with big businessmen and management and consider themselves much closer to the industrial workers when it comes to economic issues affecting the working class. They themselves are often wage-earners and prefer higher wages to giving more benefits to capitalists.

They also identify with the workers's desire to share in management decisions in the factories. This table seems to indicate, then, that the differences between industrial and non-industrial workers are not so great in basic economic areas which set the working class against the big bourgeoisie. There is more of a possibility to unite the working class on these economic issues than on other issues not so near to their pocketbooks and over which they are divided -- land for peasants, civil rights for Communists.

What is also very clear, however, is that although workers favor such bread-and butter- issues, they do not identify any political party as attempting to promote them. Table 4 definitively shows that neither industrial nor non-industrial workers have a clear awareness that parties are associated with key economic issues pertaining to their interests -- higher wages, lower cost of living, government price control. The parties of the left have made these issues central to their platforms, but in 1958 they certainly had not convinced the workers of this. Hence, although there may have been a basis on which to mobilize working-class support for the left on economic issues, this potential had not been exploited sufficiently at the time of the survey, and many workers especially among the non-industrials were going to cast their votes on the basis of other factors -- e.g., the attractiveness of the personality of candidates. This definitely hurt the left due to the popularity of the conservative candidate, Jorge Alessandri, who had a broad-based appeal due to his long reputation for honesty and integrity.







Until now we have been dealing with a bivariate relationship-- i.e., work category as the independent variable and political choice (whether it be party or candidate) as the dependent variable. We shall now introduce a third variable -- namely, sex. Table 7 presents the data on candidate choice controlling for sex.

In this survey women constituted approximately 61 percent of the total sample, and for the working-class subsample they accounted for 64.7 percent of those interviewed. The women are clearly oversampled, and this may be due to the fact that the survey was probably conducted in homes during daylight hours when the men were at work. Furthermore, not all the women in the working-class actually work -- the question on occupation asked what did the head of household do for a living. In the industrial subsample very few of the women are workers due to the nature of the labor involved.. There is probably a higher percentage of women workers in the non-industrial category. Nevertheless, despite the fact that many of the women are not workers, their husbands are and they share the same socio-economic status of the family and thus one can examine what impact that status has on their political choices.

Table 9: Working-Class Candidate Choice Controlling for Sex

Candidate	Industrial (165)		Non-Industrial (169)		Combined (334)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Allende	53.6%	45.8%	25.0%	24.0%	41.9%	33.6%
Frei	18.8	16.7	14.6	15.7	17.1	16.1
Bossay	5.8	4.2	12.5	12.4	8.5	8.8
Alessandri	21.7	33.3	47.9	47.9	32.5	41.4
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
N	69	96	48	121	117	217

Diagram 4: Candidate Choice of Male/Female WorkersIndustrial Workers  
Males (N=69)Industrial Workers  
Females (N=96)Non-Industrial Workers  
Males (N=48)Non-Industrial Workers  
Females (N=121)

When the working class as a whole is analyzed with regard to choice of candidate, there seem to be some clear differences between men and women. They both give about an equal percentage of their preferences to the two Center candidates (Frei and Bossay), but they are just about opposite in their views of Allende and Alessandri:

Table 10: Workers and Major Candidates by Sex

	Allende	Alessandri
Men	41.9 (49)	32.5 (38)
Women	33.6 (73)	41.5 (90)

The men of the working-class seem to be decidedly more to the Left than the women. Allende attracts the males, and Alessandri attracts the females -- and the respective percentages are mirror images of one another.

However, when the working-class is divided into the industrial and non-industrial groups, this difference among the sexes does not operate in the same way for each group:

Table 11: Industrials and Major Candidates by Sex

	Allende	Alessandri
Men	53.6 (37)	21.7 (15)
Women	45.8 (44)	33.3 (32)

Table 12 : Non-industrials and Major Candidates by Sex

	Allende	Alessandri
Men	25.0 (12)	47.9 (23)
Women	24.0 (29)	47.9 (58)

For the industrial workers, both the men and the women choose Allende as their preferred candidate, although the men do so in greater proportion. The females who belong to industrial worker households give a plurality (45.8%) to Allende, whereas the industrial men give him a definite majority (53.6%). (Both the men and the women in this group give about equal amounts of their preferences to the two Center candidates.) Sex differences are operative in the sense that the females are not as far to the Left as the males and, in addition, a substantial number of women (33.3%) among the industrial families do in fact prefer Alessandri while only 21.7% of the men voice such a preference.

For the non-industrial workers, sex differences are not operative in political choices. Both the men and the women are decidedly to the Right in exactly the same proportions -- they prefer Alessandri to Allende by nearly a two to one ratio. (On the two Center candidates they are also equal.) What is operative seems to be the occupational status itself, and this is making both sexes conservative in their political preferences.

Throughout this analysis the non-industrial workers have consistently proven more conservative in their attitudes than the industrials. A major reason for this difference is probably due to the nature of the work involved and the different influences this work exposes each group to. The non-industrial category includes a multitude of odd-job occupations and domestic service in the homes of the middle and upper-middle classes as well as independent tertiary work. Neither of these non-industrial groups considers itself categorized as manual laborers in the same sense that the

skilled and unskilled of the industrial occupations are, and they often take on the same conservative political attitudes of the middle and upper-middle classes for whom they work or serve on a daily basis.

The industrial workers, however, are not exposed to these influences and have a very different socialization process in the factories. The Socialist and Communist parties are very strong in the labor unions which are active in the factories among the workers. The majority of men in these industrial occupations identify with the candidates of both these parties as being defenders of the interests of the blue-collar class in Chile.

Ideally, we would want to control for union membership in our subsample of industrial workers to test union influence. However, this information was not available to us. Nevertheless, there is strong indications from other sources that unions do have a significant impact on the political attitudes of workers in Chile.<sup>10</sup>

We could find no substantive explanation for the relatively high vote among the industrial working men for Alessandri -- 21.7%. It may very well be that these industrial male supporters of the conservative candidate either were non-union members or were very much influenced by the personal appeal of Alessandri, a factor which has long been one of his strengths as a politician. For whatever reason, it is clear that over a fifth of the male industrial workers are conservative and this opens a significant cleavage among the bastion of support for the Left. These findings question the assertion that the working-class -- or even the industrial



workers among them -- has a cohesive political consciousness and that it can be readily mobilized as a class by the Left for political action.

The wives of the factory-working men are not as exposed to the influences of the Socialists and Communists in union activities on the job site. They are not workers themselves, but housewives. They are also more religious in their attitudes and in their allegiances to the Church, and they tend to be less enthusiastic for Communist and Socialist candidates who have never received Church endorsement. This explains why industrial working-class women are not as far to the Left in their candidate preferences as are their husbands. Nevertheless, socio-economic status has a significant influence in their political choices and they are quite different from the women of the non-industrial group.

An additional consideration in examining working-class political attitudes is voter registration. The registered are the key group because they are the ones who will have the impact at the polls.

Among all the workers in the subsample who expressed a preference for a candidate, 61.4% (205 of 334) were registered voters. However, when the workers are disaggregated into industrials and non-industrials, there is a definite cleavage. Apparently 65% of the non-industrials are registered, while only 57.5% of the industrial workers are. ( See Table 13.)

Table 13: Registered Workers and Candidate Choice.

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>All Workers</u>	<u>Registered Workers (61.4%)</u>
Allende	36.5%	35.1%
Frei	16.5	16.1
Bossay	8.7	9.3
Alessandri	38.3	39.5
Total	100.0%	100.0%
N	334	205
	No ans.: 83	No ans.: 65

	<u>Industrial Workers</u>		<u>Non-Industrial Workers</u>	
	<u>All</u>	<u>Registered (57.5%)</u>	<u>All</u>	<u>Registered (65%)</u>
Allende	49.1%	45.8%	24.3%	25.6%
Frei	17.6	17.7	15.4	14.6
Bossay	4.8	5.2	12.4	12.8
Alessandri	28.5	31.2	47.9	46.7
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	165	96	169	109
	No ans.: 44	No ans.: 35	No ans.: 39	No ans.: 30

This difference in voter registration among industrials and non-industrials is important since it affects the relative influence of Allende and Alessandri among the workers as a whole. Among all the workers, Alessandri has a slight edge over Allende (38.3% to 36.5%). However, among those who are registered, Alessandri's margin increases so that among those workers he leads Allende 39.5% to 35.1%. When the two groups of workers are examined separately, it is clear that the lower rate of registration among the industrial workers is definitely hurting Allende and is the factor which makes his influence decline among the registered workers as a whole.

Among the industrials, Allende leads Alessandri 49.1% to 28.5%, but among the registered industrial workers his margin decreases so that he is ahead 45.8% to 31.2%. Among these industrial workers who are Allende's strongest supporters, he loses ground while Alessandri actually gains ground among those who are registered.

For the non-industrials, when comparing registered to unregistered, Allende gains slightly and Alessandri loses a small amount of support. However, Alessandri's strength among the non-industrials is so large to begin with that this small amount of gain does not help Allende significantly.

It is clear, then, that the more conservative group among the workers -- namely, the non-industrials -- tend to register in greater proportions than the more leftist industrial workers. This undoubtedly gives greater advantage to the conservative candidate, which is seen clearly in the statistics.

In addition, even among the more leftist industrial workers, the conservative candidate gains ground among those who are registered voters. Allende led Alessandri by a margin of 20.6% among all the industrial workers, but his margin was cut to 14.6% among those industrial workers who are registered.

In controlling for registration among the workers, therefore, there are significant differences which emerge -- not only between the industrial and non-industrial workers but also within the industrial group between Allende and Alessandri supporters. In both cases, the cleavage benefits the more conservative candidate.

Finally, there is a large group among both the industrials (26.7% -- 35 of 131) and the non-industrials (21.5% -- 30 of 139) who are registered voters but who do not indicate a preference for any candidate in the election. This also indicates a further split among the workers and is additional proof that there are severe gaps in working-class political consciousness.

Summary and Concluding Remarks to Part I

At the beginning of this section of the paper we pointed out two hypotheses on the working-class and politics in Chile prominent in current literature. We proceeded to test these hypotheses using survey and ecological data.

Our findings were the following:

1. With respect to the social base of the Communist and Socialist parties we found that industrial workers form the electoral core of these parties. Thus, the first hypothesis is verified by our data with the modification that industrial workers and not the working-class as a whole serves as the support base of the Left.
2. With respect to working-class attitudes towards political parties, candidates and issues, we have found no cohesive class oriented behavior but rather deep cleavages and indecisiveness among workers.
3. There is a direct relationship between position in the labor force and political preference. Specifically, those employed in industry, construction and mining are more likely to support the Left, while those employed in the services or self-employed are more likely to support the Right even though their objective class position is decidedly working-class.
4. When we control for sex, the cleavages are refined. Women in industrial working-class families are more conservative than their husbands which undermines Leftist strength in this sector.



5. There remain many undecided and silent workers further weakening the Left.
6. The parties of the Left have been unable to attract workers on issues alone. Workers do not single out these parties as promoters of higher wages, agrarian reform and other issues even though it is known that these parties have in fact campaigned on these issues. The candidate of the Left although more attractive to workers than are the parties, is similarly unable to unify the workers in support of the Left.

Thus, we conclude that there is no cohesive political consciousness among workers (whether they be industrials or non-industrials) nor are they readily mobilizable by the Left for its political battles.

Part II

Perhaps ecological analysis can give us additional information on working-class political preferences. We must keep in mind, however, that one cannot "know how the members of a given stratum actually vote from ecological data. We can only surmise this from the relationship between the vote and the relative concentration of the members of a given strata in different areas. The more homogenous the unit of analysis and the smaller it is, the greater our certainty about the actual behavior of the individuals involved."<sup>11</sup>

The index of the relative size of the industrial working-class we have chosen is the percent of the labor force in secondary employment (manufacturing, construction or mining). Although this category includes persons in white-collar jobs and in management, it is the best indicator of working-class residential patterns at the commune or municipal level. Communities with more than forty percent of their population in secondary employment are considered high-density working-class areas.

If we examine the electoral results for the presidential elections of 1964 and 1970 for all Chilean municipalities, we find that, in general, the larger the size of the industrial working-class in a municipality the larger the Allende (leftist) vote. The Allende vote increases among men and women although among women support for Allende is consistently below male leftist support. This positive relationship is clearly evident when we look at the vote for Allende in the urban communes of Santiago Province. (see Tables 14 and 15)

Beyond the positive relationship that obtains as one goes from the high-income areas (Las Condes, Providencia) to the low-income municipalities (San Miguel, La Granja), there are a number of important observations we can make from the Santiago data presented.

1. Allende's strength lies among men in general and working-class men in particular. In almost all cases, Allende receives over two-fifths of the male vote.

2. Although it is clear that many urban workers vote for the candidate of the left, it is also clear that many do not. Almost one half of the men voting in working-class areas chose Frei in 1964 and about the same number chose Alessandri or Tomic in 1970. We also find that a majority of women residing in working-class communities do not vote for the left. The combination of these two facts means that the left, although strong among workers relative to other groups, finds difficulty in obtaining a majority vote in low-income areas. In the 1964 Frei-Allende contest, for example, Allende was not able to capture any of Santiago's municipalities. Allende's loss of Greater Santiago in 1964 was due primarily to the non-support of women for his candidacy and the fact that many more women than men voted in that election.

3. In the 1970 election Allende's base of support in the working-class areas proved crucial to his election. Unlike 1964, the opposition was not united behind one candidate —the conservatives supported Alessandri, and the Christian Democrats and independent center backed Radomiro Tomic. Consequently, the

Table 14: Voting Behavior in 1964 Presidential Election in Santiago communes ranked by percent of industrial working-class. \*\*

Percent of Labor Force in Secondary Employment	Commune	ALLENDE			FREI				
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
less than 20									
12	Providencia	21.6	13.7	16.7	19.4%	73.3	82.6	79.0	77.0%
16	Las Condes	28.8	17.1	21.7		68.0	80.2	75.4	
19	Cartagena	28.4	20.6	24.6		65.5	74.7	69.9	
20 to 30									
21	Talagante	45.9	31.7	39.2	31.7	50.6	65.2	57.7	63.5
22	San Antonio	47.1	36.9	42.2		46.1	57.1	51.4	
24	El Tabo	24.4	15.8	20.1		66.2	77.2	71.8	
27	Nuñoa	35.1	23.7	28.8		59.7	72.1	66.6	
30 to 40									
31	Santiago	38.0	25.8	31.8	32.7	56.6	69.6	63.2	62.6
31	San Bernardo	45.2	32.3	38.7		48.5	62.7	55.7	
33	Peñaflor	40.0	28.5	34.6		57.0	67.9	62.1	
34	La Florida	38.7	28.9	33.8		58.7	68.7	63.7	
35	Maipu	44.4	32.1	38.3		53.0	64.9	58.9	
40 to 50									
42	Puente Alto	49.1	36.5	42.9	42.0	47.0	60.4	53.7	54.9
42	Barrancas	54.2	42.4	48.3		43.5	55.0	49.3	
44	Quinta Normal	47.4	35.0	41.2		49.1	61.6	55.3	
45	La Cisterna	46.0	34.5	39.9		50.7	62.3	56.9	
46	Renca	49.2	37.7	43.2		47.9	59.5	54.0	
46	Conchalí	47.0	35.5	41.1		49.9	61.3	55.7	
50 or +									
51	San Miguel	52.0	39.7	45.6	46.2	44.7	57.3	51.2	50.8
52	La Granja	55.0	42.7	48.7		43.4	48.9	48.9	

\*\* Percentages computed from raw figures provided by the Registro Electoral, Santiago. Percentages of labor force in secondary employment based on 1960 population census. Data is presented in A. Mattelart, Atlas Social de las Comunas de Chile, 1965.

Table 15: Voting Behavior in 1970 Presidential Election in Santiago  
Communes ranked by Percent of Industrial Working-Class.

Percent of Labor Force in 2ndary Employmt.	Commune	ALLENDE				ALESSANDRI				TOMIC			
		Men	Women	Total		Men	Women	Total		Men	Women	Total	
less than 20													
12	Providencia	18.2	12.1	14.5	} 17.1%	58.8	63.1	61.4	} 57.7%	22.0	23.1	22.7	} 24.0%
16	Las Condes	24.2	15.6	19.0		51.4	57.3	55.0		23.3	26.0	25.0	
19	Cartagena	26.6	19.6	23.1		44.7	51.6	48.1		27.9	28.2	28.0	
20 to 30													
21	Talagante	37.8	25.8	31.9	} 30.9	29.3	37.6	33.3	} 41.7	32.2	35.9	34.0	} 26.0
22	San Antonio	47.9	37.6	42.8		28.6	34.1	31.4		22.7	27.5	25.1	
24	El Tabo	28.2	19.7	24.1		47.6	54.3	50.8		23.1	25.1	24.1	
27	Nuñoa	34.4	23.7	28.5		40.3	47.8	44.5		24.2	26.6	25.5	
30 to 40													
31	Santiago	35.9	24.7	30.1	} 31.2	38.1	47.3	42.8	} 41.2	25.0	26.9	26.0	} 26.5
31	San Bernardo	42.5	25.4	36.7		29.1	35.6	32.4		27.3	31.8	29.6	
33	Peñaflor	38.8	26.8	33.2		30.7	38.7	34.4		29.5	33.6	31.4	
34	La Florida	38.6	27.5	33.1		36.0	43.3	39.5		24.0	27.1	25.5	
35	Maipú	44.4	32.8	38.7		35.8	36.3	32.6		26.0	30.1	28.0	
40 to 50													
42	Puente Alto	49.4	37.0	43.0	} 41.6	29.7	36.9	33.4	} 29.8	19.6	24.7	22.2	} 27.5
42	Barrancas	52.5	41.8	47.1		21.0	24.9	23.0		25.7	32.3	29.0	
44	Qta. Normal	46.8	35.0	40.8		27.7	34.1	31.0		24.5	29.8	27.2	
45	La Cisterna	46.1	34.3	39.8		28.2	34.7	31.6		24.5	30.0	27.4	
46	Renca	47.7	35.9	41.6		24.7	30.5	27.7		26.5	32.5	29.6	
46	Conchalí	46.1	35.2	40.5	27.4	32.5	30.0	25.6	31.3	28.5			
50 or +													
51	San Miguel	52.1	40.0	45.8	} 47.0	25.1	32.4	28.9	} 28.0	21.8	26.7	24.4	} 24.1
52	La Granja	56.6	45.5	50.6		21.7	28.3	25.1		20.4	25.2	23.0	



non-left vote was split two ways, while Allende's support remained relatively stable. He was thus able to gain substantial pluralities in all of Santiago's low-income areas. In La Granja, the municipality with the greatest percentage of industrial workers, Allende obtained an absolute majority of the vote. In fact, La Granja was the only Santiago commune to register an increase in the Allende vote among men and women between 1964 and 1970.

The same pattern as that of the province of Santiago discussed above emerges when we order the ten largest urban centers of Chile according to percent of population engaged in secondary employment. We find that Allende's vote grows as the size of the industrial working-class increases. Also, because of the three-way split in 1970, Allende was able to carry the cities of Chillan, Antofagasta, Valparaiso, Talca, Valdivia, Concepcion and Talcahuano, all of which he lost to Frei in 1964. (See Table 16)

Table 16: Voting Behavior in the 1964 and 1970 Presidential Elections in Chile's 10 largest Cities Ranked by Size of Industrial Working-Class.

Percent of Labor Force in Secondary Employment	City	Allende	Frei	Allende	Alessandri	Tomic	
25 or less							
20	Temuco	30.8	62.4	26.9	42.2	20.3	
23	Pto. Montt	29.6	34.0% 62.8	59.0% 33.6	37.6	37.5% 28.0	28.0%
25	Chillán	40.3	52.5	42.1	32.0	25.2	
25 to 35							
26	Antofagasta	44.5	50.0	42.0	33.0	24.0	
28	Valparaíso	34.6	36.6 61.0	59.1 33.7	30.8	32.8 34.0	31.0
29	Talca	42.2	53.4	41.1	29.5	28.0	
30	Viña del Mar	33.0	64.1	29.6	38.7	30.5	
35 or more							
36	Valdivia	46.3	48.5	44.9	32.2	22.1	
38	Concepción	38.0	42.3 55.0	51.7 37.3	32.2	28.2 29.3	28.9
39	Talcahuano	46.8	48.5	47.5	18.1	33.3	

One of the most important support groups of the Left is to be found in the mining centers of Northern Chile. As the table below shows, Allende has solid support in all mining regions with the coal miners of Lota and Curanilahue showing great solidarity in support of the Communist-Socialist candidate.

Women in the mining regions are strong supporters of Allende. In fact, in all four copper mining areas female support for Allende grew between 1964 and 1970. We find that unlike working-class families in the cities, where men and women often vote in diametric opposition to one another, mining families tend to be much closer in their ideological and political preferences.

Ratios of Allende votes to opposition votes among men and women in Chile's mining regions in 1964 and 1970

Mining Zones	Number of Allende Votes per 100 Frei Votes in 1964		Number of Allende Votes per 100 Alessandri-Tomic Votes in 1970	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
<b>Copper:</b>				
Chuquicamata	92	53	78	79
Potrerillos	96	54	114	59
El Salvador	137	59	174	86
Sewell	167	99	175	116
<b>Nitrate:</b>				
Iquique	126	71	111	71
Pozo Almonte	195	104	193	103
Lagunas	189	112	148	92
Toco	284	142	234	143
Pedro de Valdiva	241	103	248	121
<b>Coal:</b>				
Coronel	297	160	264	141
Lota	408	213	383	207
Curanilahue	486	329	350	226

The ecological data presented above leads us to the conclusion that working-class support for the communist/socialist coalition candidate is significant but by no means constitutes overwhelming support for the Left. Instead, the electoral data presented gives further indication that the Chilean working-class, as with the working-class in France and Italy, show definite and persistent internal cleavages that have yet to be bridged by the organized left. Only in the relatively isolated and unionized mining areas of Chile has the left established itself firmly among workers.

The group that seems of particular importance for the left forces is the industrial working-class. It is generally assumed that this group of workers is particularly strong in its support of the left and endorsement of socialist or radical policies. We have already seen however that even within this group substantial numbers oppose the left and are lukewarm in their support of radical alternatives. Perhaps a more recent survey of industrial workers will shed some light on the findings thus far presented.

The survey data we shall use was collected by Patrick Peppe in 1968-9. It is a stratified cluster sample of 36 factories in the Santiago area. The factories were chosen from three industrial branches (metals, textiles, and leather and shoes) and from three plant size categories (small -25/100, medium-101/350, large-350 or more). Although we must keep in mind that this sample was not intended to be representative of the entire Chilean working-class, the data does provide an opportunity for a closer look at industrial

workers' attitudes about politics, unions, work and economic situation and principles of democracy.

The tables below show the distribution of responses to questions asked of workers regarding their 1964 candidate preference, the ownership of factories and the parties that favor the working-class. We notice that industrial workers were deeply divided on all these questions. Among the men, there is an almost even split in their choice of the candidate of the left and the candidate of the center-right. Among the women, the preference is overwhelmingly for Frei. Also note that in 1964 many workers made no choice at all. That is to say, more than a third of all workers did not vote.

We find similar differences among the industrial workers sampled when asked to choose between socialist ownership of the factories or capitalist private enterprise. Men and women are equally likely to oppose worker and/or state ownership of factories and support private ownership by entrepreneurs. This finding raises questions regarding assertions made about workers' propensity to support worker or state control of the means of production. The socialists and communists in Chile have been unable to convince a majority of workers that state and/or worker ownership of factories would redound to the benefit of workers. And as we can see from the table on parties favoring the working-class, the left has been similarly unable to convince a majority of workers that they are the legitimate representatives of working-class interests. Only 50.3 percent of the men and 34.2



percent of the women felt that the left and center-left favored the working-class. The women seem to be less certain about this question as reflected in the high don't know percentage.

Table 17: 1964 Candidate Preference of Industrial Workers in Santiago, Controlling for Sex

1964 Candidate Preference	Men	Women	Total
Salvador Allende	46.1%	16.7%	42.1%
Eduardo Frei	49.3	83.3	53.9
Julio Duran	4.6	0.0	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	152	24	176
DID NOT VOTE	31.2% (69)	46.6%(21)	

Table 18: Factory Ownership Opinions Controlling for Sex

To Whom should the factories belong?	Men	Women
Workers and/or the state	40.3%	37.8%
Entrepreneurs and the state	7.8	4.4
Entrepreneurs	49.8	48.9
Don't Know	2.3	8.9
Total	100.0	100.0
N	221	45

Table 19: Workers' Attitudes on Political Parties and the Working-class

Which Political Parties Favor the Working-class?	Men	Women
Left and Center-left	50.3%	34.2%
Christian-Democrats	20.8	18.4
Radicals	12.7	7.9
Right and Center-right	8.1	7.9
Don't Know	8.1	31.6
Total	100.0	100.0
N	173	38

To what extent do socio-economic variables help explain the cleavages outlined in the above tables? In general, we find that <sup>negative</sup> economic situation is associated with increased leftist political attitudes and identification with parties of the organized left. Specifically, we find that as possibilities of promotion decrease the vote for the socialist-communist coalition candidate will increase as will preference for worker or state ownership of factories. In Table 20 we see that those who consider their promotion possibilities as good are less likely to vote for Allende (28.6%) than those who see themselves stationary in their jobs (48.7%). We must note however, that even within the group that considers their prospects for mobility as poor we find that 50% still choose Frei. Thus, we cannot explain much of the difference in support for Allende or Frei by this economic variable. There is nonetheless a fairly strong linear relationship between choice of candidate and <sup>negative</sup> appraisal of promotion possibilities.

Table 20: Appraisal of Promotion Possibilities  
and 1964 Candidate Preference.

1964 Vote	Good	Regular	Bad
ALLENDE	28.6%	42.0%	48.7%
FREI	65.7	51.6	50.0
DURAN	<u>5.7</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>1.3</u>
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	35	62	78

This same kind of positive linear relationship also obtains in Table 21. The workers who desire and expect promotion are the least likely to endorse socialist control of the factories by the workers and the state (24.5%), while 46 percent of the non-mobile workers support such ownership.

Table 21: Appraisal of Promotion Possibilities  
and Attitudes on Factory Ownership.

To Whom Should the Factories Belong?	Good	Regular	Bad
Workers and the State	24.5%	40.8%	46.0%
Entrepreneurs and the State	0.0	6.1	11.5
Entrepreneurs	66.1	51.0	40.7
Dont Know	<u>9.4</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>1.8</u>
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	53	98	113

These differences are explained largely by the fact that the mobile workers find their situation quite satisfactory under prevailing relations of production, i.e. under private management, and fear losing their position of relative advantage in a shift to

worker or state ownership. Thus, only few of the mobile workers will endorse such a shift. The less mobile workers have little to fear from a shift to worker or state ownership and are thus more likely to support socialist ownership of the means of production.

Workers' negative appraisal of their economic situation is also associated with increased participation in union activities. We find, for example, that the more negative a worker's attitude about his possibilities for promotion, the more likely it is he will be a union activist. Similarly, the greater the sense of a deteriorating economic situation over time, the greater the impulse for active participation in the union.

Survey findings also tell us that a worker's view of the relationship with factory owners is an important determinant of union participation. Thus, the belief that the factory owner has little or no concern for the well-being of the workers is closely associated with union activism. Also, the greater a worker's sensed hostility of future owner-worker relations, the greater the likelihood of active union participation.

In turn, we have found that unions are key agencies in the support and or dissemination of political beliefs among workers. To test this hypothesis a union participation scale was constructed based on five questions asked in the survey. Workers were placed in a low, medium or high activism category. A majority of workers were low participants (57 percent), that is to say, they belong to the union but play no role in union activities. Forty-three percent are participants with 24 percent of these, actively engaged in the union on a more or less daily basis.

We hypothesize that the more an individual worker participates in union activities, the more likely it is he will endorse socialist alternatives.

In the survey we are using, the workers were asked their opinions on two questions relevant for the test of this hypothesis. The first question referred to land reform and asked whether they thought land expropriation should be with compensation to the landowners or without it. Table 22 shows that a majority of union activists believed land reform should be pursued without compensation to landowners, while over three quarters of the non-activists opposed such policies. Similarly, a majority of union activists believed that the factories should be owned by the workers and the state rather than by industrial entrepreneurs. In contrast, low and medium level union participants expressed the view that the capitalists should own and control the factories. (cf. Table 23)

In addition, when asked who they voted for in the 1964 presidential elections, a majority of union activists chose the socialist-communist coalition candidate, Salvador Allende. Thus we can conclude, from the above data, that intense involvement in the union is linked to radical political opinions and significant support for the socialist candidate.

Table 22: Attitudes on Land Reform and Levels of Union Participation.

Should land be expropriated with or without compensation?	Union Participation		
	Low	Medium	High
WITHOUT	24.5%	34.8%	53.6%
WITH	75.5	65.2	46.4
TOTAL	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>
N	131	46	56



Table 23: Attitudes on Factory Ownership  
and Levels of Union Participation.

## UNION PARTICIPATION

To Whom Should the Factories Belong?	Low	Medium	High
Workers and the State	39.4%	36.2%	51.7%
Entrepreneurs and the State	6.6	6.4	11.7
Entrepreneurs	<u>54.0</u>	<u>57.4</u>	<u>36.7</u>
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	137	47	60

Table 24: 1964 Candidate Preference and  
Levels of Union Participation.

## UNION PARTICIPATION

1964 Vote Candidate	Low	Medium	High
ALLENDE	32.5%	41.2%	55.0%
FREI	63.9	52.9	41.2
DURAN	<u>3.6</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>4.0</u>
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	83	34	51
DID NOT VOTE	41.9%	30.6%	17.7%
N	60	15	11

We further hypothesize that as union participation increases, solidarity with other members of the "lower-class" increases. <sup>data generated from the</sup> The/1968 survey we are using lends strength to this hypothesis. We find that in general, industrial workers demonstrate a high degree of solidarity with Chilean peasants, the urban sub-proletariat and with fellow workers. What is notable however, is that the intensity of that solidarity increases as participation in union activities increases. Thus we find that a) union activists are more likely to endorse a sympathy strike in support of other striking workers, b) they are more likely to believe that peasants and industrial workers have common class interests, and c) union activists are more likely to espouse union support for the demands of neighborhood associations in slum areas.

Table 25: Degree of worker solidarity and levels of union participation.

Should your Union Give Help to other Striking Unions?	UNION PARTICIPATION		
	Low	Medium	High
Solidarity Strike	16.9%	20.4%	37.1%
Work Stoppage	13.5	14.3	9.7
Economic Help	61.5	65.3	51.6
Moral Support	6.8	0.0	1.6
Should do Nothing	1.3	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	148	49	62

Table 26: Worker-Peasant Solidarity and Level of union participation.

Do Industrial Workers and Peasants Have Common Interests?	UNION PARTICIPATION		
	Low	Medium	High
Yes	75.0%	91.8%	92.0
No	21.0	6.1	6.4
Dont Know	4.0	2.1	1.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	148	49	62

A third hypothesis that finds support in the data is that the more an individual worker participates in union activities, the more likely it is he will have positive attitudes towards the democratic electoral process.

We find that an overwhelming majority of union activists consider elections and the electoral process important, while a majority of non-activists tend to view elections as unimportant. Also note that union activists are more likely to exercise their right to vote than non-activists: approximately 42% of the latter did not vote in 1964, while 82% of the activists did. Thus, the conclusion we reach is that involvement in union activities contributes to the support of and participation in democratic processes. Findings from another survey of Chilean industrial workers lends strength to our hypothesis.

Table 27: Attitudes on Elections and Levels of Union Participation

Are Elections and the Electoral Process Important?	UNION PARTICIPATION		
	Low	Medium	High
Yes	46.6%	49.0%	75.8%
No	52.7	51.0	24.2
Dont Know	.7	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	148	49	62

In 1967 Professor Alain Touraine of the University of Paris conducted a research project sponsored by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America on attitudes of workers in Chile. The survey involved a sample of 920 industrial workers, and it included three questions relating to belief in, and commitment to, democratic processes in Chile.

Respondents were asked whether they agreed, disagreed, or were indifferent to, these three statements:

- 1) "All politicians are thieves, and the one one that isn't now will be when he gets in."
- 2) "The government should outlaw some political parties."
- 3) "If there were only one political party, there would be a better government."

The following table shows the proportion of workers who are cynical about politicians and who support

restrictions on the traditional forms of Chilean political parties. In each case, this proportion constitutes a majority.

Parties and Politicians

	Disagree	Indifferent	Agree	NA
Political Cynicism	35.1 (323)	11.3 (104)	53.3 (490)	.3 (3)
Outlaw Party	40.7 (374)	5.8 (53)	53.3 (488)	.5 (5)
Single Party	30.3 (279)	6.2 (57)	62.9 (579)	.5 (5)

These findings tend to support Lipset's thesis that industrial workers are characterized by authoritarianism and anti-democratic attitudes. (Political Man, 1960, p. 87ff.)<sup>8</sup> Lipset argues, however, that this tendency decreases with participation in various organizations, but that "low participation in political or voluntary organizations of any type" strengthens this working-class disposition toward authoritarianism. (Lipset, 1960: 52,91,100-01.)

The following table based on the Touraine survey, however, indicate that union membership alone is the most significant organizational affiliation which diminishes alienated attitudes regarding democratic procedures:



Organizational Affiliations

	Union Only	Any Mult. Affiliation	Neigh- borhood	Sports	Religious
Political Cynicism	48.0 (135)	55.7 (355)	56.9 (87)	54.6 (284)	55.4 (103)
Outlaw Party	49.1 (138)	54.9 (350)	56.9 (87)	54.4 (283)	62.4 (116)
Single Party	60.5 (170)	64.2 (409)	64.7 (99)	64.0 (333)	67.2 (125)
TOTAL	30.5 (281)	69.2 (637)	16.6 (153)	56.5 (520)	20.2 (186)

In addition, Touraine found that those workers who are most involved in the union -- i.e., who discuss union affairs every day -- were the last likely to be cynical about politicians and to want to restrict party activities in Chile:

Frequency of Discussions About Unions

	Daily	At Times	Almost Never	Never	NA
Political Cynicism	45.1 (41)	56.9 (259)	50.8 (61)	51.2 (129)	
Outlaw Party	42.9 (39)	52.1 (237)	54.2 (65)	57.9 (146)	
Single Party	51.6 (47)	59.8 (272)	73.3 (88)	67.9 (171)	50.0 (1)
TOTAL	9.9 (91)	49.5 (455)	13.0 (120)	27.4 (252)	.2 (2)

This finding is very interesting and contradicts Lipset's position that Communist-controlled unions are a threat to democratic processes in society at large since

they tend to inculcate a close-minded attitude among their constituents:

It is fairly obvious that Communist labor leaders are not anxious to encourage and deepen internal democracy in their unions, but rather recognize that by multiplying the controlled activities of the members they are increasing their own chances to reach and indoctrinate the membership and so reducing the possibility that it will develop hostile attitudes and withhold support in a crisis situation.<sup>12</sup>

Touraine and Peppe in their respective surveys show that this is not the case in Chile. Peppe concludes that "intense involvement in the union is linked to the greatest degree of support for important aspects of Chile's formal democracy and contributes independently to support for an unrestricted party system."<sup>13</sup> Thus, although the labor unions have had a long history of communist and socialist control, their members have developed healthy attitudes regarding Chilean political institutions relative to other members of the working-class.

The reason for this probably has been the democratic procedures and attitudes that have long existed in Chilean unions-- eg., secret-ballot elections, decentralization of structures and participation in union decisions by workers-- all of which have led to optimistic attitudes on the part of workers about the possibility of removing union officials they do not like. Chilean unions have provided, then, an atmosphere and a socialization process for their members which have had a positive impact on worker attitudes towards the political democratic structures in Chilean society.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>See the following: Maurice Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics of the Cuban Working-Class. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970. Maurice Zeitlin and James Petras, "The Working-Class Vote in Chile: Christian Democracy Versus Marxism," British Journal of Sociology, March, 1970, pp. 16-29. James Petras, "La clase obrera chilena," Los Libros (Buenos Aires), Jan/Feb., 1971, pp. 11-13. Patrick Peppe, "Working-Class Politics in Chile," (unpublished PhD dissertation), Columbia University, 1971. Louis Goodman, "Blue-Collar Work and Types of Modernism in Santiago, Chile." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Sept. 1971.

<sup>2</sup>Both Zeitlin and Petras place great weight on this point in their conclusions from analysis of ecological data in working-class areas of Chile.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Zeitlin and Petras, "The Working-Class Vote in Chile: Christian Democracy Versus Marxism," p. 28.

<sup>4</sup>In our computations we have combined the Zamarano supporters (very few) with those of Allende in order to determine the total preference for the Left.

<sup>5</sup>James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development. Los Angeles: University of California (Berkeley) Press, 1970, p. 180. (pb. edition)

<sup>6</sup>Cf. Mattei Dogan, "Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: The Free Press, 1967, p. 141, Table 5.

<sup>7</sup>Richard Hamilton, Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic. Princeton: Princeton Press, 1967, p. 133.

<sup>8</sup>Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966, pp. 420-21.

<sup>9</sup>Ecological data for the 1958 election was not available to us. However, in the 1964 election the Center and the Right joined in a coalition against the Left and backed Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat, against the Leftist candidate, Salvador Allende. Hence, it is fair to use the 1964 ecological data for our purposes.

<sup>10</sup>In Part II of this paper we shall analyze the influence of union membership and activism on political attitudes and behavior based on Patrick Peppe's 1968 survey of Chilean industrial workers.

<sup>11</sup> cf. Zeitlin and Petras, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>12</sup> Lipset and Trow, Union Democracy, 1956, p. 78-9.

<sup>13</sup> Peppe, op. cit., p. 242.