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THE CONCRETE UTOPIAS AND THEIR CONFRONTATION WITH
THE WORLD OF TODAY

I. A new egalitarian world order for nation states or a new egalitarian world order for human beings?

In the extraordinary recent flowering of normative declarations on development one can distinguish two main strands. 1/ One strand consists of relatively concrete demands for egalitarian reforms in the international economic order. The other strand consists of relatively diffuse appeals for "unified development", "integral development", or "another development" within countries combined with a worldwide transformation of human values and priorities. At first sight, the two strands complement each other, but the manner of their juxtaposition within the declarations suggests a series of compromises between quite different views of human societies and their "development", a new phase in the long-continued attempts to define this elusive concept, with the holders of different positions contributing additional utopian-normative elements and seeking common ground with each other under the impact of the present multifaceted international

1/ The declarations and reports of this kind appearing during 1975 alone include: Another Development, the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report on International Development and Cooperation; Reviewing the International Order (RIO), Interim Report of the RIO Project, prepared during the second general meeting, Rotterdam, 17-20 June 1975; Report, New International Economic Order Symposium organized by the Netherlands Government, The Hague, May 1975; The Planetary Bargain: Proposals for a New International Economic Order to meet Human Needs, Report of an International Workshop convened in Aspern, Colorado, July-August 1975; Communique of the Third World Forum, Karachi, 1975; Proposals for a New World Order, prepared by a Special Task Force of the Third World Forum, Mexico, August 1975; Report, Special Meeting of the Club of Rome, Guanajuato, Mexico, July 1975; Situación de América Latina en la Actual Coyuntura Internacional, Comunicado del Foro Latinoamericano, Caracas, Agosto 1975; The Chaguaramas Appraisal, Second Regional Appraisal of the International Development Strategy and Establishment of a New International Economic Order, approved at the sixteenth session of the Economic Commission for Latin America, May 1975; Resolution on Development and International Co-operation, approved at the seventh special session of the United Nations General Assembly. A number of meetings on more specific questions - population, literacy, the status of women - included similar general considerations in their declarations or "plans of action".

crisis. 2/ The proponents of the two strands cannot be distinguished by a dividing line between spokesmen of "developed" countries and the Third World; participants concentrating on one strand or the other come from both sides of this line.

The former demands envisage the achievement of equality by the Third World countries or by their economic systems within an international order continuing to derive its dynamism from production for export and from international flows of investment and technological innovation. They suppose that "development" for the Third World countries can continue to mean what it has meant for the countries now rich and industrialized - mass production and mass consumption continually stimulating each other to new heights - but with the cyclical crises, struggles for markets, exploitation of the weak by the strong, ravaging of the human environment, and other disbenefits of such development tamed by some combination of planning, bargaining and good will. It may be questioned whether an economic order reformed by intergovernmental agreements while retaining central mechanisms and motivations of the present order can really function in this way, or whether the forces that are likely to dominate during the foreseeable future will really be disposed to make the experiment. At least, however, these are demands on which governments can base strategies and seek united action among themselves. They respond to a supposition that countries have common and internally harmonious interests voiced by their governments; that overcoming the poverty of a country and gaining it an equal voice in the international order are equivalent to overcoming the poverty of its people and gaining them an equal voice. Such demands do not really require the conscious intervention of the masses of a national population, who figure, in their demonstrated poverty, as justifications or the demands of their governments, as performers of economic roles, and as eventual recipients of the benefits supposed to flow from the new order.

2/ Marshall Wolfe, El Desarrollo Esquivo: Exploraciones en la Política Social y la Realidad Sociopolítica (Fondo de Cultura Económica, México 1976) discusses earlier stages of this quest.

The appeals for "unified development" or "another development" within countries raise problems of a quite different nature, that governments are hardly in a position to tackle, and that even the non-official intellectuals offering themselves as spokesmen for the Third World commonly evade when they seek consensus in declarations. 3/ The posing of human equality and elimination of poverty as objectives of development is not new, but the combination of these objectives with autonomous participation by the masses in the making and carrying out of developmental decisions, with the curbing of superfluous consumption and husbanding of the human environmental patrimony for future generations, and with a transformation of societal values make up a formidable agenda. The indispensable precondition for "another development", in fact, is a worldwide conversion or change of heart, involving all the social forces that have a share of power. The prizes for which these forces have contended since the dawn of the capitalist economic order then become almost irrelevant. The mass of consumers in the rich countries and the rich in the poor countries must learn to live austerely. Political leaders, entrepreneurs, scientific-technological innovators, and the military must renounce the struggle for power and prestige in favour of co-operation and fostering of popular initiative. The centralized state with its bureaucratic and coercive mechanisms must everywhere give way to direct democracy and self-management at the level of the community and the enterprise. The groups controlling the transnational corporations must set them objectives of job creation and production of goods meeting basic human needs rather than maximization of profits. The impoverished masses must moderate their demands to what the national variant of "another development" can afford. The declarations insist that the first steps in this

3/ The alternative terms emphasize different aspects of a common aspiration. "Another development", introduced by the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report, implies that what is wanted is something quite different from previous concepts of development, not only in welfare priorities but also in an open-ended experimental pursuit of human equality and collective self-reliance. "Unified development" and similar terms that came into vogue toward the end of the 1960's convey the supposition that the pursuit can be planned and subjected to universalist norms.

direction must be taken immediately; human needs cannot wait. Their prescriptions for the future are in all-or-nothing terms; humanity is either to be saved or to be damned in its totality. 4/

Sometimes the declarations refer to the need for "political will" and try to frighten the forces dominant nationally and internationally with warnings of catastrophe if they do not change their ways. Sometimes they shrink the enormous problems of planning for societal transformation into problems of devising correct methodologies and indicators of progress - problems whose solution can be entrusted to international experts and research projects. Even the declarations that try hardest to come to grips with the problems of power, values, and national diversity - in particular the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report - continually fall back on the passive voice in recommendations through inability to identify a societal deus ex machina who might convert aspirations into action.

In fact, the proposals combining "unified development" or "another development" with economic equality between countries have the earmarks of concrete utopias devised by committees. They are concrete in their attempt to construct blueprints of an attainable future. They are utopian in the immediatism and universalism of their formulations. Their origin in committees and forums, that intentionally bring together representatives of different regions, different disciplines and different ideologies conduces to an over-generous inclusion of objectives and prescriptions strongly supported by some members and not seriously objectionable to the others and, more important, to an evasion of issues on which the views of participants are irreconcilably different - in particular, whether "another development" is to come about by the conversion of the

4/ According to the report of the 1975 Special Meeting of the Club of Rome, for example: "El completo desarrollo de las potencialidades de todos los hombres es necesario si las desigualdades deben ser corregidas y si se busca poner a la disposición de cada individuo una vida digna y saludable. Las estrategias, las políticas, y los procedimientos de planeación para el desarrollo nacional y global deben subordinarse a estos fines". (My underlining.) Taken literally, the first sentence is tautological. Taken as a mandate to planners it is staggering.

mighty or their overthrow, and whether the basic concepts of "economic development" remain valid. Under these constraints, the new proposals become attempts to devise a convincing new myth without altogether alienating the governmental devotees of the waning myth, at a time when the requirements for conviction and consensus are much more complex than the simple faith that correct economic policies will eventually enable all peoples to achieve the level of consumption of the industrialized peoples.5/

While the appeals for "another development" now enter to a surprising degree into inter-governmental declarations and while they are presented as demands of the dispossessed majority of the world's people they are, to a much greater extent than the accompanying demands for economic equality between nation states, the brain children of circles of intellectuals and reformers meeting in differing combinations in one forum after another. They lack the dynamism of movements fighting to advance the interests of their members and the discipline of coherent ideologies or theories of social change. The immense majority of the world's poor know nothing of them nor of the international organizations that endorse them, in spite of the reiterated attribution of authorship to these same poor. The world's middle classes hear just enough to make them uneasy;

5/ "... los mitos funcionan como lámparas que iluminan el campo de percepción del científico social, permitiéndole tener una visión clara de ciertos problemas y no ver nada de otros, al mismo tiempo que le proporcionan tranquilidad espiritual, pues las discriminaciones valorativas que realiza aparecen a su espíritu como un reflejo de la realidad objetiva." "Ahora sabemos de manera irrefutable que las economías de la periferia nunca serán desarrolladas, en el sentido de semejantes a las economías que forman el actual centro del sistema capitalista. Pero cómo negar que esa idea ha sido de gran utilidad para movilizar a los pueblos de la periferia y llevarlos a aceptar enormes sacrificios, para legitimar la destrucción de formas de cultura arcaicas, para explicar y hacer comprender la necesidad de destruir el medio físico, para justificar formas de dependencia que refuerzan el carácter predatorio del sistema productivo? Cabe, por lo tanto, afirmar que la idea del desarrollo económico es un simple mito. Gracias a ello ha sido posible desviar la atención de la tarea básica de identificación de las necesidades fundamentales de la colectividad y de las posibilidades que abre al hombre el progreso de la ciencia, para concentrarla en objetivos abstractos como son las inversiones, las exportaciones y el crecimiento." (Celso Furtado, El Desarrollo Económico: Un Mito (Siglo Veintiuno Editores, México, D.F., 1975), pp. 13-14 and 90-91.)

while a significant fraction of these middle classes may also feel a certain guilt and may harbour a conviction that "something must be done", there is no convincing evidence that the bulk of them will voluntarily make sacrifices of the magnitude called for by "another development", and a good deal of evidence to the contrary. The world's rich and powerful keep their own counsel, or manoeuvre to make the proposals innocuous by embracing them.

When one examines the writings since the 1960's of the participants in the present elaboration of concrete utopias, one finds that the criticisms that can be levelled at their collective declarations have already been made by them as individuals with a completeness and realism that leave practically nothing to add. The "soft state", the pervasively corrupt state, bureaucratic inertia, the delusions of technocratic planning, the distortions of formal education, the inhibitions on decision-making at the national level, the gap between pretensions and performance in international aid, the forces making for mystification and ambiguity in policies are in full view. In other words, their diagnoses show: (a) a low degree of governmental rationality and capacity to plan confronting complex and continually changing challenges; (b) adherence by the dominant forces in most national societies to elitist values, implying the enjoyment of privileges precisely because they are privileges outside the reach of the majority, and satisfaction with "nature's plan, that they shall take who have the power, and they shall keep who can"; (c) among the masses susceptibility to mobilization and united effort mainly in support of **traditional parochial causes** - national prestige, territorial aggrandizement, religious and ethnic quarrels. Within each nation state, large or small, simple or complex in its social and economic structures, political contests are under way for a bewilderingly varied assortment of prizes that absorb the participants to the practical exclusion of the great question posed by the concrete utopias, of human survival on terms making survival humanly meaningful.

/Such diagnoses

Such diagnoses have left some of their authors profoundly pessimistic concerning the possibility of future realization of their own democratic and humanitarian values. 6/ Others, on the basis of their evaluation of present power structures and the characteristics of the classes benefitting from or exploited under them, opt reluctantly for essentially reformist approaches requiring enlightenment of the national elites and the dominant forces in the world centres, and assignation of leadership to strong states hopefully capable of representing the longterm interests of the national society. 7/ Still others conclude that a revolutionary democratization of societies throughout the world accompanying a transformation of values must be possible because it is necessary. 8/ Still others try to construct operational blueprints for the transformation of their own societies and to demonstrate the non-viability of other paths to the future, eschewing universalism and relying on the force of rational demonstration to recommend the blueprints to national elites or political forces able to take power and apply them. 9/

Even the more optimistic observers seem from time to time to be agonizingly aware of floundering in a bog as they try to move from the multiform absurdities and injustices of present human relationships and national policies to some firm path leading to national and international

6/ See, in particular, Barrington Moore, Jr., Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate them (Beacon Hill Press, Boston, 1970); and Robert Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1975).

7/ For example, Gunnar Myrdal, The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Programme in Outline (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1970). New York Pantheon Books, 1970.

8/ For example, Joost B.W. Juitenbrouwer, Premises and Implications of a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 1975); Fundación Bariloche, El Modelo Mundial Latinoamericano (Resumen presentado a la VIII Reunión de la Asamblea General del Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, Quito, Noviembre de 1975).

9/ For example, Oscar Varsavski, Proyectos Nacionales (Ediciones Periferia, Buenos Aires, 1971); Helio Jaguaribe, Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study (Harper and Row, New York, 1973).

orders capable of giving priority to human equality and the satisfaction of the basic needs of all human beings. Overt rejection of such priorities has been muted to a degree that would have been unthinkable a few decades ago. The proliferation of declarations and "plans of action" demonstrates a consensus of respectable opinion: the world order is in crisis and must be transformed. But this consensus has the yieldingness of the bog rather than the firmness of a path supporting a vigorous advance in any one direction.

Economists have retained the central role in shaping the more recent proposals for alternative styles of development which they (or other economists) held in preparing earlier blueprints for the future. Certain economists have, in fact, taken the lead in the criticisms now heard on all sides of the narrowness of the economic vision focussed on investment for acceleration of growth in production; in some cases, abjuring their own earlier prescription as planners. One of them indicates the reasons for their continuing central position as follows:

In line with traditions that are now more than two centuries old, we economists have this slightly paranoid but socially useful bent of mind; we naturally accept the responsibility for taking a broad view of a whole country, and indeed of the whole world, and for thinking in dynamic terms of national and international policies. Place any economist in the capital city of an underdeveloped country and give him the necessary assistance and he will in no time make a Plan. In this regard we are unique among the social scientists. No sociologist, psychologist or anthropologist would ever think of trying to do such a thing. 10/

This predisposition of economists meets the need of the sectors of public opinion that have become sensitized to the gravity of the world crises to believe in the possibility of plannable, universally applicable solutions. If the previous prescriptions for development have not worked satisfactorily, new and "more comprehensive" prescriptions must be needed.

10/ Gunnar Myrdal, op. cit., p. 37

Since the early stages of diagnoses and planning for "economic development", the dominant economists have invited the participation of other social scientists and specialists in social policies, but naturally on their own terms. The latter are now closer to the centre of developmental thinking than before, since the more innovative economists as well as political leaders have convinced themselves that the difficulties in the way of "another development" are not primarily economic.

Sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and psychologists, however, cannot be much more at home in their new responsibilities than in their previous role of diagnosing and prescribing for "social obstacles" to "economic development". "Modernization", the main general concept advanced by these other social scientists to complement "economic development" has turned out to be as elusive and ambiguous in relation to human welfare as development itself. "Another development" calls for "another modernization". Whether their attention centres on national social and political structures, classes interest groups, communities, families, or individuals whose responses are conditioned by these wider circles, they see transformations under way that will undoubtedly incorporate influences from the campaigns for egalitarian, welfare-oriented, and environment-oriented styles of development and that will influence these campaigns in return, but that are not susceptible to planned and orderly shaping by any identifiable agents. The demand for social and political prescriptions for the management of these transformations leads back to contradictions in which development policies up to the present have recurrently been entangled whenever they have ventured beyond a narrowly economic focus: standardized spontaneity, popular initiative channeled to targets imposed from above, co-operative action expected from groups with conflicts of interests clearly perceived by them.

Social scientists other than economists in the Third World may be somewhat more disposed than their counterparts in the "central" countries to view the state as a coherent entity rather than an aggregation of bureaucracies and interest groups, but few of them would attribute to the states now on the stage the degree of autonomy and benevolence needed if they are

to lead the way to "another development". In most cases, the state, whatever aspirations its techno-bureaucracy might harbour, would be the agent of forces incompatible with any systematic move in such a direction. 11/

Assignment to the state of the task of constructing "another development" (or, in another current formulation, "exercising the right to choose a national style of development") thus in the real world points to the probability of an array of Potemkin villages masking the pursuit of group interests by the forces dominating the state. The greater the apparent autonomy of the state apparatus the greater the opportunities for counterfeiting of achievements, concealment of failures, and proliferation of corrupt practices and special privileges among the "servants" of the state.

Nor are the prospects for withering away of the state through the coming to power of a social class destined to do away with exploitation, or through the generalized enlightenment of the population up to the

11/ In a 1972 conference of Latin American and United States social scientists it is striking that the former generally attribute coherent purposes to the state, whether as "the executive committee of the capitalist class" or as a semi-autonomous actor, while the latter see "bureaucratic policy-making", in which each component of the state apparatus can, up to a point, pursue different objectives in alliance with different interest-groups in the society (e.g., the "military-industrial complex" and the ties of sectoral government agencies with organized farmers, organized labour, etc.), with an approach to unity to be expected only in the presence of a menace perceived as extraordinarily threatening to the interests of the whole society. (See Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen, Ed., Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1974). Fernando Henrique Cardoso, however, has diagnosed the Brazilian state in terms rather similar to the second view. (Autoritarismo e Democratização, (Paz e Terra, Rio de Janeiro, 1975), especially p. 182.)

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achievement of ability to manage its own affairs co-operatively and non-bureaucratically, through direct democracy, much more promising. The present boom in construction of concrete utopias, in fact, has followed a withering away of the faith that flourished in important proportions of different social classes in the industrialized countries from the 19th century up to the 1940's that the Good Society would be achieved shortly after the coming to power of the proletariat or of a democratic-socialist intellectual elite. During the 1950's various observers of social change evaluated this withering away optimistically in terms of the "end of ideology" and the clearing of the way for consensus on practical and incremental reforms. At present, even in the national societies in which material conditions, political culture, and discontent with the prevailing style of development might seem most propitious, one now finds a predominant sentiment of the complexity and ambiguity of progress, in which each achievement brings new problems without fully overcoming the old ones, in which all the conceivable paths to a better future are roundabout, with the pitfalls along the way easier to foresee than the happy ending.

There seems to be no plausible alternative to the conclusion that societal transformations will have to continue to struggle through the bog of cross-purposes, evasions and resistances, even if the preconditions for deliberate modification of styles of development become as favourable as can realistically be hoped for. Some national societies may enhance their strength within the world order without enhancing the well-being of their members; others may do both; still others, unfortunately, may do neither. Some classes and groups within countries will lose existing advantages, will be forced to change their ways of livelihood, will be left in or reduced to extreme poverty whether or not the majority gains and whether or not the overall trend is toward equality. There can be no guarantee to any of the societal actors that their struggles and sacrifices will lead to results that can be defined in advance. In spite of the internationalization of "plans of action", the transformations will continue to take place within the boundaries of nation states and states whose dominant forces are striving to make them into nations. In each state, the interplay of ideologies, strategies, power relationships, pressures and conflicts only

tenuously related to "development" will point to different possible outcomes. One of the most striking contradictions of the present situation is the simultaneous discrediting of the nation state as incapable of coping with the challenges it faces, the renewed insistence on self-reliance and the right of the nation state to choose its own style of development free of external pressures, and the continued proliferation of states whose capacity for self-determination is much more questionable than that of the states whose leaders are convinced that integration in larger units is the only viable option.

Organized, democratic participation in decision-making by the people concerned will continue to be the only effective means of curbing exploitation, manipulation, bureaucratization, and corruption of the forces nationally dominant, whether in purportedly capitalist, socialist or hybrid political and economic systems. Such participation, however, will continue to be precarious and conflictive, in continual tension with the supposed requirements of a coherent national strategy for allocation of resources. Campaigns capable of mobilizing significant sectors of public opinion behind legitimate objectives of "another development" - e.g., for racial and sexual equality, for elimination of poverty, for protection of the environment - like many less legitimate or less relevant campaigns, will continue to gain force from exaggeration and single-minded militancy, and will continually risk distortion into ritual activities providing a means of livelihood and enhanced status for their promoters. To the extent to which the public is able to make itself heard in different national societies, priorities will emerge from the power and skill with which different claims are advanced within the system of political bargaining, with a continual tendency for the responsibilities assumed by the state to exceed its capacities, and for measures designed to satisfy heterogeneous objectives to form an aggregate having consequences quite different from those intended by any of the actors.

Such documents as the two reports of the Club of Rome insist that piecemeal, intuitive, or common-sense tactics to cope with the multifaceted crises of the future will be worse than ineffective; they will contribute to

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the disasters they are supposed to ward off. If this is correct and if one can see no prospects for responses that are other than piecemeal and mutually contradictory, is any hope left for humanity? Are the concrete utopias devised by committees with their universalism and immediatism, their hospitality to all kinds of worthy causes, anything more than another ritual recognition that the situation is desperate?

One might vary the common formulation to the effect that "humanity must choose" between paths leading to survival and destruction, and urge that the intellectual fathers of the concrete utopias choose between the different conceptions of the human future that are now combined in their declarations. Do they envisage that a correct combination of "practical", "concrete" reforms negotiable between present governments can set humanity on the path to what they mean by "development"? Do they aim at images of the future that can inspire and mobilize social forces for a transformation very different from the optimal results of reforms that are now negotiable? It may be that the mixture of proportions based on different conceptions and aimed at different publics weakens their convincingness both as negotiable packages of demands and as mobilizing myths. While individuals and political movements referring their actions back to a coherent theory can choose, however, it is of the essence of the international debate over the future international and national orders that the participants must fall back on formulas suggesting that humanity can have its cake and eat it, that equality for nation states with their present dominant forces within a world system requiring continued economic growth dynamized by consumption demands and armaments expenditures can be reconciled with equality for human beings within societies requiring radically different incentives and human relationships. In national societies today, and in the international order itself, one sees these conceptions hybridizing or contaminating each other. In the national societies most wedded to the necessity of rapid economic growth governed by market mechanisms, one finds the dynamism of this process increasingly entangled with elaborate and costly public services and regulations stemming from egalitarian, welfare, and environmental preoccupations and from the power of interest groups disposed to tolerate the functioning

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of the system only to the extent that it incorporates their demands. In the United States as well as Europe these preoccupations and pressures are changing the functioning of the societies in ways that would have been inconceivable a few years ago, without, however, replacing the private stimulation of consumption and the public allocations of resources supposed to maintain the previous dynamism. The increasingly stringent legal requirements that private as well as public enterprises answer for the "impact" of their activities on the environment, on health, on racial and sexual equality, etc., exemplify the trend.

At the same time, the increasing numbers of national societies whose dominant forces strive or pretend to strive for an egalitarian style of development with completely different sources of dynamism are continually reintroducing material features and motivations associated with the "consumerist" style. Their higher bureaucratic and military circles are rarely prepared to practice the egalitarian austerity they prescribe for the rest of the population and this cannot be altogether concealed from the latter. The capacity of the transnational corporations to offer technological innovations, diversification of exports, and jobs in exchange for a dependable low-wage labour force tempts the governments to make concessions incongruous with their overall conception of development. The income-earning lure of mass tourism introduces additional incongruities, both through the necessity of a style of consumption for tourists that is not wanted and that cannot be afforded for the national population, and through the need for part of the national population to adopt picturesque or subservient roles to attract the tourists.

At the international level the interpenetration of the two conceptions of development generates further contradictions, or at least a juxtaposition of objectives whose compatibilization would require a comprehensive rationality and global planning capacity that are not in sight. The one conception requires that the "rich" countries continue to expand their purchases of raw materials from the "poor" countries, at high and stable prices, and welcome imports of manufactures. The other conception requires that the "rich" countries use raw materials more sparingly and leave a much larger share for direct meeting of the needs of the "poor" countries; the latter should also

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expand their manufactures primarily to meet basic needs of their own people.

The one conception implies that the poor countries and the rich should become even more interdependent. The other conception implies that both groups should become more self-reliant and views the resulting constriction of certain lines of economic growth as a gain rather than a disaster. 12/ The one conception implies that tourists should visit the poor countries in large numbers and spend freely. The other conception implies that visitors should live austere and place their skills at the service of the people they visit. Under the one conception, the transnational corporations, properly watched and regulated, but retaining their present profit incentives, are an indispensable instrument of development. Under the other conception, the transnationals can be tolerated only on condition of a transformation of their incentives and their functioning that would practically convert them into philanthropic foundations.

The style of development that has dominated most of the world until recently has revealed too many anomalies and dangers to be able to mobilize the indispensable minimum of consensus but the alternatives must continue to contend with its powerful momentum and their own conceptual weaknesses. The central countries may well reduce their rates of economic growth over the long term as the "Bariloche Model" along with other guides to the

12/ "Todas las contribuciones para una ruptura del modo de integración imperialista apuntaría a la autosuficiencia de los países periféricos y centrales. Está demás insistir que la autosuficiencia no es autarquía, pero no está demás señalar que es posible que esta ruptura, a que aludimos, traiga como consecuencia alguna reducción del comercio internacional entre países centrales y periféricos. Esta reducción sería muy ventajosa en el largo plazo si se traduce en una disminución de exportaciones periféricas que sustentan un modelo de sociedad de consumo en los países centrales, y en una disminución de exportaciones de países centrales que son insumos y bienes de capital para sustentar una estructura industrial en países periféricos al servicio de intereses minoritarios." (Lucio Geller, "Notas sobre Delinking y Relinking", Seminario-Foro del Tercer Mundo sobre Auto Apoyo Colectivo, Lima, Febrero de 1976).

future demands, 13/ not because of altruism, but partly because of ecological constraints, partly because of inability to find adequate substitutes for sources of dynamism - armaments and the automobile - that for one reason or another have to be curbed, and partly because of growing dissensus over life styles and national objectives. It is unlikely that under such conditions their dominant forces, trying to cope with severe internal tensions, could or would pay much attention to the corollary demand that they compensate the Third World for past exploitation. Even if lower growth rates derive from harmonious changes in values, popular preferences to work less and live more simply, the producers would hardly go on striving to produce goods to benefit the rest of the world, and they might learn to do without the non-essential goods they now buy from the Third World. Behind the present debate lurks a recurrent fear: however irrational and unjust the combination of carrots and sticks by which the modern economic systems have kept human beings innovating, producing, and squabbling over distribution, do not the alternatives all lead to stagnation and eventually bureaucratic compulsion?

The present paper deliberately evades the enormous question of the survival of humanity as affected by population growth, resource exhaustion and the deterioration of the ecosphere. It endorses the values of "another development" but reserves judgement on the likelihood that such values can be realized harmoniously and predictably, through any combination of planning and exhortation. The following sections concentrate on two questions: (a) The

13/ "Los sectores privilegiados de la humanidad - esencialmente los países desarrollados - deben disminuir su tasa de crecimiento económico para aliviar su presión sobre los recursos naturales y el medio ambiente, y además para contrarrestar los efectos alienantes del consumo excesivo. Parte del excedente económico de esos países debería destinarse para ayudar a los países del Tercer Mundo a superar su actual estancamiento, resultado en parte de la explotación a la que estuvieron, y a la que en buena parte continúan, sometidos." (Fundación Bariloche, op. cit.)

seeds of change that can be detected in national societies as they affect the prospects of a future different from what might be projected from past trends and susceptible to initiatives oriented by the egalitarian and humanitarian values informing "another development". (b) The implications of the posing of "elimination of poverty" - interpreted alternatively as raising of minimum consumption levels or achievement of social and political equality - as the central and immediate objective of "another development".

II. Seeds of change in different types of national societies within the international order; their relevance for Latin America

(a) Hypotheses

The following chapter will present certain factors bearing on future prospects for the international order and for Latin America in particular, from a perspective differing from, although not necessarily incompatible with, other surveys now current. Although national and international, economic and non-economic factors cannot satisfactorily be kept apart, it will concentrate on the national and the non-economic, and on what these imply for the prospects of "another development" and a "new international economic order". The factors are labelled "seeds of change" to suggest that their present visibility cannot measure their future importance. Not all the "seeds" will germinate and some of them will grow into feeble or purely ornamental plants; intellectual fashions, personal values and preferences will unavoidably influence judgements concerning the future prospects of the "seeds". The general hypotheses informing the presentation, already suggested in the preceding chapter, are the following:

1. The two dichotomies that have governed international discourse on "development": (a) between "developed" (central, industrialized, rich, imperialist) countries and "developing" (peripheral, poor, dependent, exploited, non-industrialized) countries; (b) between "capitalist" (market economy) and "socialist" (centrally planned) countries, never entirely satisfactory simplifications of reality, are losing their validity, not because of a general "convergence" between countries on the two sides of either dichotomy, but because of the emergency of an increasing number of intermediate, anomalous patterns. A few of the "developing" countries have become wealthier than any of the developed according to the conventional indicator of GNP per capita. Others have become predominantly industrialized and more wedded to the unrestricted operation of

/market forces

market forces than are most of the "developed" countries today. At the same time, traits are coming to the fore in the "developed" countries that are incongruous with previously accepted images of "market economy" or "centrally planned" economy, including traits previously singled out by their spokesmen as responsible for "under-development". 14/

2. In the different groups of countries - whether classified by regions, income levels, political systems, or otherwise - internal social, cultural and political changes are interacting with the strictly "economic" processes (in production, technology, marketing, finance, etc.) and with international political tactics in pursuit of governmental views of national interests. The former changes seem to be exceedingly self-contradictory and ambiguous; no clear dominant trend is visible. The internal changes characteristic of each group of countries react on the rest through imposition, borrowing, and deliberate rejection, further complicating the national patterns. They impose constraints on the capacity of governments in all types of national societies to adopt and apply coherent policies vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

3. The formulation of norms for a "new international economic order" and for ideal styles of development at the national level are at one and the same time products of these self-contradictory changes and factors to be taken into account in their future evolution. They coincide with a pronounced lack of dynamic leadership and of wide popular support for any one strategy aimed at overcoming present crises. This applies to most countries

14/ For example, the dominance of the "planning system" of large corporations in the United States over the "market system" in the rest of the economy, the symbiosis of this private planning system with the public bureaucracy, and the relative impoverishment and exploitation of the rest of the society, as interpreted by Galbraith, have much in common with interpretations of structurally heterogeneous development in Latin America. (John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the public purpose, Houghton, Mifflin Co., Boston, 1973.) Such a trend toward "heterogeneization" may well co-exist conflictively with the trend toward "homogeneization" noted by Celso Furtado in El Desarrollo Económico: Un Mito, op. cit., p. 81.

at present, whatever their level of "development", their political-economic system, or their dominant ideology. It is a moot question whether the shortcomings of leadership should be attributed to the nature of present challenges and the exhaustion of the capacity to inspire confidence in previous prescriptions for development, or vice versa. In any case, the continued elaboration of all - inclusive normative declarations and "plans of action" is in part a ritual substitution for real capacity to cope with change. Activities of this kind will exert some real influence on the directions of change and the ways men interpret change but, filtered through structures exerting greater resistance to some actions than to others and transforming the meaning of certain actions, may well produce results as far from the intentions of their present sponsors as have all the great mobilizing myths of history.

4. In an unweighted listing of the seeds of change it may be permissible, although not entirely satisfactory, to leave in the background the framework of international economic relationships and of power politics, which have received more attention than the points to be discussed. ^{15/} It can be assumed that most of the seeds of change will continue to be relevant whether or not the central countries recover relatively high growth rates and whether or not their interaction with each other and with the rest of the world becomes more co-operative or more conflictive. The terms of the listing reflect an expectation that the future will be a mixed one, of alternating growth generating inflation and recessions pushing up unemployment, of conflicts subsiding in some areas and springing up in others, of concessions by the centre to the periphery that the latter will continue to identify as too little and too late. The governments may well continue to

^{15/} Joseph Hodara, "La Coyuntura Internacional : Cuatro Visiones" (CEPAL/MEX/BORRADOR/SDS/75/2, septiembre de 1975) presents particularly suggestive ideas on the international economic-political future. Helio Jaguaribe, *op. cit.*, explores systematically the alternatives for Latin America on the supposition that the United States will enhance over the long term its capacity to exercise hegemony for coherent purposes within an economic and political order similar to the present.

play a power game not too different from the past, but with their capacity to mobilize internal support for it sharply reduced and their attention continually diverted by domestic contradictions. The degree and kind of attention that the leaders of the central countries can pay to the rest of the world may thus become very cramped, whatever the demands emanating from the latter.

5. The "developed" countries with capitalist or mixed economic systems and electorally democratic political regimes can be divided roughly into several sub-groups: the United States, set apart by the size of its economy, the world permeation of its life-style, and the reactions deriving from its eroding world hegemony; the large industrialized European states; the smaller European states; the industrialized Commonwealth countries of North America and Oceania; Japan; and the Mediterranean "Latin" countries. Similar seeds of change can be identified in all these sub-groupings, but in widely differing combinations. The socialist countries, excluding the more recent non-industrialized Third World recruits, fall into two sub-groups: U.S.S.R. and East European associates, on the one hand, and China, on the other. In the Third World, a grouping by geographical regions coincides in the main with other relevant traits, although not with the increasingly important but persistently elusive distinction between the "socialist" and "non-socialist".

(b) The industrialized or post-industrial "market-economy" countries

1. Disillusionment with the capacity of the "welfare state" to "solve problems" and with the capacity of political parties to change the behaviour of the state for the better are on the increase. Generalized resentment of high taxes, bureaucratic controls and attempts by the state to regulate behaviour for social goals is visible. Steadily rising income and consumption levels over several decades have cushioned social conflict but have not left the state in a stronger position to assign resources and set national priorities once these trends are interrupted. At present, relatively high levels of inflation and of unemployment, together with the dissemination of warnings that the previous patterns of growth will not be viable in the future, intensify public insecurity and distrust of the

/state. It

state. It becomes publicly evident that a wide range of policies supposedly devoted to national defense or human welfare are really governed by objectives of propping up the economic system without succeeding either in stopping inflation or providing full employment.

2. The pursuit of semi-autonomous policies and pressure group tactics by military and intelligence establishments, by sectoral bureaucracies and by large corporations in the "planning system" (in Galbraith's term) become more widely known and resented. Public interest in exposures of corruption and illegal manipulations rises and combines with other sources of distrust of the state and politicians.

3. Middle- and working-class life styles and consumption goals change, although the standards of the high-production high-consumption society remain predominant. The influence of the "work ethic" and the prestige of durable consumer goods ownership begin to decline. Leisure, vacation travel, sexual contacts, and a wide range of "do-it-yourself" activities become more highly valued and socially acceptable. Presumably these trends exert interacting depressive influences on the quality and quantity of goods produced and on the market for non-essential consumer goods; at least, impressions that this is happening are beginning to enter into popular stereotypes concerning the situation.

4. Aggressively egalitarian and libertarian movements emerge among racial and linguistic minorities, women, youth, homosexuals, etc., prepared to enforce their demands by militant and disruptive action. The distrust of the state thus coincides with continually increasing pressure on the state to guarantee rights and offset social or biological handicaps by regulations and compensatory services (as in the case of free abortions). The movements in question, particularly among the youth, either have a cyclical character, rising and falling rapidly in followings and militancy, or undergo continual metamorphoses in demands and tactics. The capacity of the mass communication media to disseminate information on them and emphasize their more extreme features exacerbates these latter traits. Interpretations rapidly become dated, e.g., those made by some social scientists in the late 1960's identifying a profound revolution on the values and behaviour of educated youth. At the same time, the clash in life styles and

the cultural shock produced by certain libertarian demands excite resistance, counter-mobilization and extra-legal disruption by other elements of the societies, including the police.

5. The traditional political roles of the middle and working classes shift to some extent. The more highly educated and upper-income elements of the middle classes become more open to new life styles, egalitarian and reformist policies, preoccupation with global issues such as environmental protection and the limit to growth. A large part of the working class, particularly the better-off and better organized elements, remains culturally conservative, becomes less open to the influence of socialist and social reform ideologies, and concentrates on particularist demands. The impingement on its immediate interests and values of the middle class cultural revolution, along with the internationalization of production and the labour market under the aegis of the transnational corporations makes it more nationalist and restrictionist in its demands. 16/

6. The complexity of the public services required by high-consumption, highly urbanized, highly mobile societies and the organization of their personnel means that a wide variety of specialized occupational groups

16/ Celso Furtado points out that the large corporations have a choice of two tactics to increase profits, to the extent that the state permits their use: exporting production to subsidiaries in countries with low labour costs and importing labour from the same countries. The immediate interest of the organized workers in the high-wage countries, except in conditions of very rapid economic growth and full employment, in which they are not interested in jobs in the lower range of skills and wages, is to exert pressure on the state to prevent the corporations from using either tactic. (Celso Furtado, El Desarrollo Económico, Un Mito, op. cit., pp. 47-48).

/either negotiating

either negotiating directly with the state (police, firemen, postal employees, teachers, doctors, etc.) or engaged in activities so central to the functioning of the society that their demands impinge necessarily on the state (transport, power and communications workers) become able to enforce demands by tactics disrupting the life-styles and expectations of large sectors of the population. Their increasing readiness to resort to such tactics, and the declining capacity of the state to prevent this by legal prohibitions and repression, coincides with widespread dissatisfaction over the declining quality of the services and the inability of the state to run them efficiently.

7. Mass formal education enters into crisis. The capacity of the schools to socialize youth and inculcate tool skills declines in spite of increasingly prolonged and costly compulsory periods of schooling. The impression gains ground that the schools are serving a custodial function (freeing parents for work and keeping the children off the streets) more than an educational function. At the same time, the "massification" of higher education devalues its role in selection for preferred occupations and leads to further prolongation at post-graduate levels. "Scholarly research" becomes increasingly formalized as a means of employing and also screening the products of higher education. Part of the eligible youth abandon education in rejection of this pattern.

8. Fertility rates decline with unexpected rapidity to levels below replacement, ^{17/} with consequent accelerated aging of the population and shifts in needs for different social facilities (unused capacity in lower levels of the schools and overburdened services for the aged). The burden

^{17/} In the countries with relatively high fertility levels in the recent past, such as the United States, this does not mean that a stationary population can be expected before the end of the century, even if the present trend continues. In Germany (D.R. and F.R.), however, and a few other European countries in which a recent sharp drop in the birth rate follows a relatively long period of low fertility, the population is now beginning to decline.

on the employed population of social security costs grows continually heavier, dispelling the illusion that such costs can be met through returns on invested contributions. The likelihood emerges that future fertility rates, with universally accesible and acceptable contraception and abortion, will fluctuate abruptly with changing cultural fashions, economic conditions, and degrees of optimism or pessimism concerning the future, resulting in unprecedentedly uneven age profiles of the population. An important increase in the relative political and cultural weight of the aged and thus in the conservatism of the societies, and a re-entry into the labour forces of the upper age groups as the supply of youthful entrants dwindles, may also be in the cards.

9. The higher-income industrialized countries become increasingly dependent on foreign labour, entering legally or illegally without families, to perform lower-paid manual work. This labour comes mainly from neighbouring "semi-developed" countries rather than from the "least-developed" countries whose excess labour force is physically and educationally ill-adapted to the demand. The semi-developed countries consequently face a drain of labour in times of prosperity, offset by remittance to families from workers abroad, and an intensified unemployment problem in times of recession, such as the present. (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Mexico, and the English-speaking Caribbean countries are those most affected).

10. Modernization of agriculture, shifts in the structure of industrial production and other factors have brought about wide variations in rates of economic growth, income levels and demands for manpower in different internal regions. In the European countries here considered, with nearly full employment since the 1940's and with slow growth in the labour force offset by the importation of labour, these disparities have not generated unmanageable tensions in the urban zones of rapid growth and immigration, but they are generating increasingly militant demands for autonomy and for a larger share of public resources from declining regions and occupations, especially but not exclusively where the regional population is culturally distinct from the national majority. In the United States,

/with exceptionally

with exceptionally rapid modernization expelling from agriculture a population with very low educational and skill levels and in large part hampered by racial discrimination, the changes have brought about a concentration in the great cities of a "marginalized" population in extreme poverty by national norms, a sometimes violent competition for jobs, services and housing between the new urbanites and the longer-established urban working class, the mushrooming of an extremely costly public welfare system that unintentionally generates disincentives to employment and stable family life, and the flight of much of the middle-class urban population to the suburbs. As the new urbanites become increasingly able to compete with other urban groups in enforcing demands through the vote and through organized action city government enters into a crisis of continually rising costs and static resources.

11. Crime, especially violent crime, increases markedly in quantity and visibility. This trend is associated to some extent with the urban crisis referred to above, but appears also in countries in which this crisis is not acute; the "respectable" elements of the societies vacillate between demands for drastic repression and demands for broad reforms directed at the social causes of crime, with declining confidence in the effectiveness of any solution. There follows resentment against the state for inability to cope with the problem; increased distrust of ethnic groups associated with violent crime; and generalized refusal on the part of the marginalized urban population to accept the role of deviants from a just social order. Resistance movements and links with political militance emerge in the prisons, increasingly overcrowded and discredited in their rehabilitatory and punitive functions.

12. Reactions of different sectors of public opinion to trends in the rest of the world become increasingly confused, self-contradictory, and resentful. The preoccupation of parts of the middle classes with world poverty, population growth, environmental and related problems becomes stronger but mingles with rising disillusionment over the efficacy of "aid" (military as well as economic and social); resentment

/over aggressive

over aggressive economic and other policies of Third World governments; uneasiness at the domestic repercussions (particularly the impact on employment) of activities of transnational corporations in these countries; hardening of stereotypes concerning the oppressiveness, corruption and incompetence of Third World governments, the exploitativeness and parasitism of their upper classes, and the terroristic bent of their revolutionaries. At the same time distrust of the motives of the home government in supporting and distributing aid and impatience with such policies in the presence of apparent governmental incapacity to solve domestic problems are on the rise. Renewed struggles by members of legislative bodies (representing conservative as well as progressive currents of opinion) to exert veto power over initiatives of the executive reflect this distrust. The sentiments of rejection are probably strongest in the United States in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, but are politically significant in the European former colonial powers.

13. In certain middle-sized countries in Europe and certain Commonwealth countries, on the other hand, the weight of public opinion seems to favour the kind of transformations in the Third World that is summed up by "another development" and to support relatively open-handed governmental co-operation in such initiatives. In the European countries in question this sentiment is associated with the achievement of relatively egalitarian welfare-oriented societies under democratic socialist governments. Elsewhere, particularly in Canada and Australia, nationalist reactions against economic, political and cultural dominance by the world centres has generated a degree of self-identification with the Third World.

14. Japan, ever since it entered the modern world order, has contradicted current theories of development and modernization. At present, it constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of expectations concerning the beneficent effects of very high economic growth rates. Most of the seeds of change discussed above are visible, but their specific traits and their probable consequences seem to be quite different from those in Europe and the United States. One sees at present: (a) Apparent proximity

/to the

to the ecological limits of growth in terms of air and water pollution and intensified overcrowding associated with mass ownership of durable goods. (b) Exceptionally rapid incorporation of the population into a consumer society, with a particularly traumatic consumer shift from products moderate in space and energy demands to the automobile. (c) Rapid increase in resistance by the working class to the low wage levels that facilitated export-oriented economic growth. (d) Demographic transition to low fertility accelerating through the 1950's, resulting in a present labour force nearly stationary in size. (e) In consequence of these four trends, an urgent need to export further industrial growth to countries with lower wage levels and more incipient pollution problems. (In contrast to Western Europe, which has imported workers to take the less attractive jobs, Japan is exporting the jobs; in the United States the two tactics have been followed simultaneously.) (f) A boom in mass tourism, mainly to countries with lower costs of recreational services; the impact of European tourism on the Mediterranean is beginning to have its counterpart in Japanese tourism in Southeast Asia. (g) Most recently, a sharp decline in the rate of growth in production and the appearance of appreciable unemployment for the first time in the post-war period. The vulnerability of the economy to external shocks and the improbability of recuperation of growth rates matching the past presumably are important stimuli to anxiety and distrust of the capacity of the state to cope; however, this is offset by a high degree of social discipline and sources of personal security not matched in the United States nor Europe. At the same time, violent rejection of the existing order by political minorities with an appreciable following among youth takes particularly extreme forms, and frustration at the shattering by external and internal factors of the dream of consumerist development may well exacerbate this.

15. In the European Mediterranean countries overall trends and patterns are strikingly different from those of the rest of Europe, in ways that are particular interest to Latin America. The countries in this group (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain; with France, on the one side, and Turkey and Yugoslavia, on the other, having many traits in common with it) are economically and socially semi-developed or unevenly developed. Their more backward internal regions are suppliers of labour not only to the more developed parts of the

same countries but also to the rest of Europe. Tourism from the rest of Europe is another particularly important factor in their economic growth and social changes. Tourism, as in Mexico and the Caribbean, demands at the same time heavy investment in modern facilities expected by tourists, the preservation of a "traditional" culture and artisanal activities, and relatively low wage rates in service occupations. These countries are undergoing rapid and uneven modernization, with more disruptive socio-cultural consequences than in the rest of Europe; differences between the lifestyles of internal regions and social classes continue to be wide. Their demographic transition to low rates of population increase is only recently completed or is now under way. Politicization is relatively intense, with Marxist working-class parties; neo-Marxist and Anarchist intellectual currents and youth movements; clerical, traditional-reactionary and neo-Fascist movements; and national-separatist movements all showing greater vigour and mass support than elsewhere in the "developed" non-Socialist world. The capacity of the state to act as arbiter is increasingly precarious, for different reasons in each country. The political role of the military is prominent but ambiguous. Resort by groups at both ends of the political spectrum to disruptive and terrorist tactics is on the increase. The resemblances to Latin American patterns are obvious, and a good deal of mutual political-ideological influence is to be expected. In the Mediterranean countries, however, the political game is more structured, the relative size and coherence of the organized working class are greater, the influence of parties with ideologies and mass memberships is strong, the importance of populism and charismatic leadership are smaller, and the capacity of the military to act autonomously in pursuit of self-determined missions is somewhat more limited. Moreover, in the cyclical swings between authoritarian and democratic-pluralist regimes characteristic of both regions, Latin America has recently been moving in the direction of increasing authoritarianism in the presence of conflicts otherwise unmanageable by the dominant forces, while the Mediterranean countries are moving in the opposite direction, with accompanying increases in the relative strength of Marxist-oriented movements. Popular frustration over economic recession and rising unemployment, swelled by the reflux of workers from the rest of Europe, at a time when the societies seem to be on the verge of mass consumerism and the workers were refusing to accept previous wage levels, may be particularly important here.

(c) The industrialized "socialist" countries

These countries fall into two "camps" whose competition for influence and for acceptance as development models will have continuing impact on the Third World, probably more crucial in Africa and Asia than in Latin America: (a) the U.S.S.R. and its European associates; (b) China (for present purposes, in view of its huge industrial productive and innovating capacity, China can be classified as "industrialized" in spite of its low income level and peasant majority), Yugoslavia, which for a time seemed to offer a third Socialist model of considerable attractiveness to the Third World, has its own seeds of change, but does not now exert an external influence calling for separate discussion. In both main camps the potential importance for the national societies and for the rest of the world of the internal seeds of change that can be identified remains obscure. The dominant forces are better able to control or conceal their manifestations than are their counterparts in the countries discussed above. For the foreseeable future both camps will probably be able to transmit to the Third World a narrower and more coherent range of stimuli than will the industrialized market-economy countries, but sudden changes in these stimuli or an increasing diversification and contradictoriness cannot be ruled out.

1. The first camp seems to have entered a period of routinized imposition of stereotypes concerning the style of development, accompanied by a generalized resignation to the inviability of the various reform initiatives of the recent past and to the ruling out of innovations dangerous to the system of political domination. The countries concerned are moving in a limited way toward the achievement of domestic "consumer societies" similar to those now entering into crisis elsewhere. This trend has two main facets: (a) a raising of consumption levels and introduction of consumer durable goods officially planned and controlled; (b) an infiltration of tastes and cultural-recreational aspirations, particularly among urban youth, that is disapproved but largely uncontrollable. The trend is hampered by the low productivity of agriculture, making the achievement of a varied diet precarious and increasingly dependent on external supplies; by the low

/capacity of

capacity of the planning system to overcome the lag in consumer goods production and distribution; by chronic problems of work incentives and societal participation associated with the routinization over a long period of a centralized system of mobilization and exhortation; and presumably by the need to devote relatively high proportions of the national income to armaments in order to match a world rival enjoying a much higher per capita income. In several countries, low birth rates over a long period are resulting in a nearly stationary and aging labour force and the beginning of labour transfer from other socialist countries. Two recent trends, of considerable importance in the smaller countries of this group are (a) increasing reliance on mass tourism from Western Europe as a source of foreign exchange; (b) increasing receptivity to transnational corporations offering technological innovations and production for export in exchange for a low-wage, dependable, relatively qualified labour force and an entry into new markets.

2. The Chinese style of development thus far seems to retain more capacity for innovation, accompanied by a unique alternation between periods of consolidation-bureaucratization and periods of revolutionary ferment generated by a combination of stimuli from above and pressures from below. It is much better shielded from the heterogeneous influences emanating from consumer societies in crisis than is the Soviet-Central European style. The sheer impossibility of substituting consumerism for shared frugality in a population such as the Chinese, the smallness of the groups even aware of other life-styles, and the capacity to generate attractive national and personal objectives should combine to preserve the coherence of the style for some time to come. This style, or rather the idealized interpretations of it current abroad, has two facets associated with the poles of the alternation mentioned above and appealing to completely different groups in the rest of the world: (a) the frugal, egalitarian, resource-conserving, orderly, peasant-based social order, generating innovations in local participation and labour-intensive production but otherwise conformist, attractive to frustrated developmentalists of many

/political complexes;

political complexions; (b) the "cultural revolutionary" challenge to political gradualism, bourgeois life-styles, bureaucratization and imperialism, accompanied by an apocalyptic vision of the future, inspiring the Maoist movements outside China and particularly attractive to minorities among university-educated youth.

(d) Regions of the Third World other than Latin America

The Third World national societies outside Latin America can be classified according to several different criteria, all of which have some relevance for present purposes: (a) according to the size of their population and their economies and thus their weight within the world order; (b) according to geographical and cultural proximity and consequent intensity of interactions; (c) according to endowment with or lack of raw materials in sufficient international demand to give them strong bargaining positions; (d) according to political regimes (stable authoritarian, one-party mobilization, negotiated balance between ethnic-religious-linguistic groups, democratic-pluralist); (e) according to levels of per capita income, urbanization and industrialization (that is, approximation to patterns of semi-development); and (f) according to the style of development preferred by the forces controlling the state (liberal-capitalist, state-capitalist, socialist, various hybrids). At present, a comparison of classifications according to these different criteria would show more incongruities than regularities; in particular, the adoption by forces controlling the state of a capitalist or socialist or hybrid style of development has become increasingly divorced from the objective conditions. At the same time, the extreme differences in national societies and the anomalies in national patterns accompany an increasing degree of international solidarity and self-identification as Third World countries confronting the central countries with common demands.

For present purposes, the following five-fold semi-regional classification may be most suggestive: (1) The Arab states (including those of North Africa) and Iran; (2) Africa south of the Sahara; (3) The South Asian states with huge populations and particularly low incomes; (4) The states of

/Southeast Asia;

Southeast Asia; (5) The island mini-states of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Caribbean. Each group is internally heterogeneous but has common traits not shared to the same degree with the rest of the Third World, and interactions within the groups - conflictive as well as co-operative - are more intense than interactions with the Third World as a whole.

1. In many respects the Arab-Iranian group has more in common with Latin America than do the other groups; very wide differences between countries in stages of economic growth, in degrees of urbanization-modernization, and in political regimes, combined with cultural-linguistic ties, well-established mechanisms for group action, and also deeply rooted sources of intra-group conflict. The larger countries, including oil exporters such as Iran as well as non-exporters such as Egypt, have reached patterns of structurally heterogeneous semi-development similar to those of Latin America. The emergence of a "modern" minority consumer society originating in rising but very unevenly distributed national incomes, and the phenomena of "marginalization" and inability of the economies to absorb a growing urban labour force, in part expelled from agriculture, are equally pronounced. The degree of voluntarism and diversity in governmental choices of styles of development is a good deal higher than in Latin America. Owing partly to oil resources and the consequent availability of large funds that governments can allocate with fewer constraints than elsewhere, partly to strategic geopolitical location, and partly to the militant solidarity deriving from the Palestine problem, this region is obviously able to exert particularly strong pressures toward change in the international order.

2. In Africa south of the Sahara problems of national identity and viability are particularly prominent, with the region fragmented into a large number of relatively small states, most of them with very short histories as independent entities within their present boundaries, few of them internally homogeneous, few of them with human or material resources sufficient for "development" as this has conventionally been understood. Thus external aid and regional solidarity, the latter partly to insure that "aid" will not perpetuate dependency and conflict between clients of

/different "central"

different "central" states, are particularly necessary and particularly difficult to obtain and manage. Initiatives for regional unity coexist uneasily with the emergence in some countries of erratic personal rule and with aspirations to autonomous national styles of development, usually labelled "socialist", intended to bypass the impracticability of conventional development policies and supply cultural-psychological compensations. Political-bureaucratic-military elites (with roles not clearly differentiated) have more weight than elsewhere because of the weakness of other social forces. Thus, the region in which material conditions are least propitious and the classes generally looked to for revolutionary demands, least structured is also the most prone at present to radical and experimental declared strategies of development. While a few of the countries (Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia) are in relatively strong positions as suppliers of important raw materials, they do not derive from this a relative weight in their region comparable to those of some Arab and Latin American countries in their regions.

3. The South Asian states are, in terms of per capita incomes and absolute size of populations at extremely low levels of productivity and consumption, the "least-developed" in the world. (For present purposes, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh belong to this group; Sri Lanka, in spite of its geographical location, has more in common with the next group to be discussed.) If international aid were distributed according to a uniform means test, the countries in this group would receive most of it. At the same time, all of them except Bangladesh have industrial sectors and export activities that, while small in relation to their populations, are fairly large in absolute terms or compared with those of other Third World countries. "Structurally heterogeneous" development, as in Latin America, generates its own market and its vested interests in perpetuation of the same style. In South Asia, the conservative character of the forces dominant over the rural majority props up this line of development politically while hampering it economically. Up to the present, socialist-reformist /aspirations of

aspirations of the national regimes have led to bureaucratization and the construction of complex systems of special privileges rather than to major changes in economic and social realities, as was documented in Gunnar Myrdal's Asian Drama. The warnings of mass poverty deteriorating into mass famines that are now current apply more plausibly to South Asia and to parts of Africa than to other regions of the Third World. In Africa, the populations threatened are relatively small, and although relief action is hindered by their geographical remoteness and other factors, famines can be prevented without unmanageable costs by international aid. If the international sources of aid do not act or act ineffectually, as in the recent Sahel and Ethiopian droughts, the international repercussions of famines in isolated thinly populated areas are weak. In South Asia, the overall capacity to increase food production faster than population is not yet exhausted, but the states seem decreasingly able to manage production incentives, prices to the consumer, and distribution networks reconciling their various objectives, and become increasingly dependent on subsidized food imports to meet shortfalls. A few bad crop years might face the international food distribution system with a challenge that the food exporting countries would not meet, particularly if production were to slump in the United States, the U.S.S.R., and South Asia simultaneously. A famine decimating the populations of some or all of the countries in this group would follow. The shock for the international order and for the region itself would be severe, but the consequences are hard to assess, and the kind of chaotic general collapse sometimes predicted seems unlikely. One might expect a conflictive exacerbation of several different trends in the central countries as well as in South Asia - toward rejection of the prevailing international order and "consumist" styles of development, toward greater national selfishness, toward more repressive regimes protecting the lives and property of the better-off South Asians with assistance from some of the central countries, and toward protracted revolutionary struggles aimed at replacement of the existing order by egalitarian austerity.

4. The national societies of Southeast Asia have in common medium size, relatively satisfactory ratios between land and population that are now endangered by high rates of population increase, and peasant majorities that, except in some war-devastated or otherwise disadvantaged internal zones, have not reached the depths of poverty and precarious food supply weighing upon South Asia. Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, and Sri Lanka belong to this group; Indonesia has many traits in common with it in spite of its larger population and the higher proportion of this population in critical poverty; Singapore and Hong Kong, as city states without a rural hinterland, have taken the lead in the kind of industrial development now rapidly growing in other urban centres of the region but naturally differ in many other respects from their neighbours. Southeast Asia now comprises states that have embarked vigorously on dependent capitalist styles of development (Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, as well as Indonesia) and states with Socialist styles closer to the Chinese than to the Soviet model (although not necessarily in their political affiliations) that have emerged following prolonged and very destructive periods of warfare (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos). Burma, with a self-isolated "military socialist" regime sui generis, and Sri Lanka, with a premature welfare state now in crisis, fall outside this classification. In the former countries income concentration seems to be on the increase; a minority urban consumer society is becoming highly conspicuous; and an underemployed marginal population is expanding along with it. The rise of mass movements of educated youth rejecting the style of development and trying to mobilize the disadvantaged urban and rural strata against it has been particularly pronounced in this region; while movements of this kind have been repressed and silenced in various countries their reappearance is probable. In the three Socialist countries and particularly in Vietnam, the aftermath of war has left no alternative to a frugal self-reliant disciplined style of development, and the war itself generated forms of mobilization and control attuned to such a style. The fact of victory

/against overwhelming

against overwhelming odds has given this style considerable potential attraction for seekers of "another development" in other relatively small countries, but it is not yet clear whether this will in practice exert influence distinct from the Chinese and Soviet models.

The geographical situation of the region and the failure of attempts by central countries to enforce hegemony over it at present gives the dominant forces of the countries a good deal of latitude in modifying the terms of external dependency by varying their relationships with China, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Japan, so that the possibilities for innovation in styles of development are relatively favourable. The deliberate self-isolation of Cambodia and the forced transfer to agricultural labour of the urban population show the degree of voluntarism non feasible under certain conditions for the regimes of small countries in zones falling outside the sphere of influence of any one central power. In the non-socialist countries one finds governmental initiatives expected to counteract the polarizing forces of the style of development (through agrarian reforms, employment creation, participatory mechanisms, conciliation of the disaffected youth, campaigns against corruption and concentrated wealth) and tactics aimed at accomodation with Socialist neighbours, combined with the maintenance of regimes sufficiently authoritarian to guarantee stable rules of the game and a dependable labour force to transnational enterprises. It is significant that several of these countries have recently been favoured areas of external investment because of confidence that their dominant forces can keep internal problems under control and that a growing market for manufactured consumer goods can be expected, while the South Asian countries have not, because their problems have increasingly seemed insuperable. There are indications that even the Socialist countries, notably Vietnam, might receive this kind of confidence if their authorities were interested.

5. The scattered island mini-states in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the Caribbean have in common plantation economies, now in many cases undergoing a transition to tourist economies; ethnically heterogeneous populations deriving largely from successive importations of plantation labour;

/weak national

weak national identities; dependence on external stimuli and constraints so pronounced as almost to rule out the possibility of autonomous styles of development. These disadvantages may paradoxically, as in the cases of some African states, stimulate an intellectual and popular striving for "something else" in the form of cultural nationalism, xenophobia, and charismatic leadership to compensate for the lack of preconditions for conventional development processes and strategies. The mini-states are extreme cases in the present crisis of the nation-state and the international order made up of nation-states - the multiplication of continually smaller units at a time when the separate viability of even the larger ones has come into question; the divorce between numbers of states and power and between numbers and population; the entry into an international order of continually proliferating organizations and meetings, on which the mini-states depend for protection of their rights and support of their precarious economies, but which places on them heavy burdens of representation and diversion of their attention from internal tasks, and which they complicate further by their efforts to participate.

(e) Implications for Latin America

The implications for Latin America of the above trends in the rest of the world are conditioned by the kind of dependent semi-development achieved by the larger countries and by the special relationships - cultural as well as economic and political - of Latin America with the industrialized market-economy countries. While some of the smaller and poorer Latin American countries have patterns closer to those of other parts of the Third World, even their reactions will be conditioned by their appreciable urban super-structures of semi-development and by the constraints imposed and opportunities offered by their insertion in the inter-American order.

Thus, all the seeds of change visible in the United States and Europe reproduce themselves and mutate in Latin America, and some seeds of change originating in Latin America germinate in the central countries, as in the case of the political-cultural unrest of educated youth. Interchanges of influence with other Third World regions, in contrast, while they may be on

/the rise,

the rise, are practically restricted to the sectors of government concerned with international affairs and development policy, certain intellectuals and social scientists, and the leaders of certain political movements. The proportion of the Latin American population, outside the Caribbean sub-region, that feels kinship with or interest in Africa and Asia must be small.

The Latin American governments, like those of the central countries, now find it even more difficult than previously to maintain reasonably coherent and flexible policies responding to the developmental vision of any dominant social force. The capacity of the military to act autonomously permits temporary suppression of the contradictions but not their overcoming. All governments, with the present exception of the Cuban, have to support the logic of the prevailing style of development dependent on the high consumption levels of minorities, cope with the pressures of educated youth to enter these minorities or to upset the system and the pressures of organized workers to raise their share of the national income, and at the same time try to act on the obligation - increasingly central to the public justification of "development" and to appeals for international aid - to eliminate extreme poverty and bring the under-employed, under-educated and under-nourished masses into some kind of productive and participatory relationship to the national society. While these pressures cannot really be compatibilized, they can be juggled and placated sufficiently to ward off disaster most of the time and even to permit considerable long-term increase in national income levels and in the stock of productive capital. The strain on financial and other resources is relieved, as far as circumstances permit, by increasing external indebtedness, increasing bureaucratic employment, and increasing assistentialism-cum-repression toward the poor or "marginalized".

If the trends summarized above, or most of them, persist into the future it can be expected that the central countries will continue to transmit continually changing combinations of stimuli, shocks, and inhibitions to the rest of the world (and, of course, to each other) and that the rest of the

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world will make equally confused and shifting responses as one pressure or another comes uppermost. The sudden impact of revelations of bribery by transnational enterprises and subversion by intelligence agencies, both byproducts of domestic political struggles in the centres, illustrate the unpredictableness of the accidents in the road ahead of any central strategy for domination. The concrete utopias and blueprints for "another development" will continue to flourish as protests against the frustrations and dangers of these trends, but at least for some time will have a mainly ornamental role in inter-governmental deliberations concentrated on bargaining tactics and defenses vis-à-vis the central countries. While the governments of the central countries will probably continue to avoid confrontations and make whatever concessions they feel they can afford, their actions will continue to respond more to domestic considerations (protecting supplies of key raw materials; satisfying the demands of the military-industrial complex and the organized workers; curbing the activities of the transnational enterprises sufficiently to keep them from contravening national employment, balance-of-payments, and other objectives) and to rivalries between themselves than to the needs and demands of the Third World. At the same time, the increasing diversity of the domestic forces able to exert partially effective pressures on central-country policies introduces wider opportunities for Third World interests, in power or out, seeking more advantageous terms of dependency or freedom from interference in transforming the national style of development, to find alternative allies in different sectors of the state apparatus of these countries, in their legislative bodies, in their political parties and trade unions, and in a wide range of organized groups promoting causes from environmental protection to equality of the sexes. An increasing internationalization of ideological-promotional movements and interest-groups may possibly co-exist uneasily with the increasing penetration of transnational enterprises and the increasing insistence on nationalism and self-reliance in styles of development.

/Some few

Some few of the smaller industrialized countries of Europe and the "high-income dependent" countries outside Europe will probably advance farther in vicarious utopianism, the promotion of "another development", in practice having to concentrate their hopes and their aid on a few promising national societies in the Third World.^{18/} Even in these latter cases, it is unlikely that popular support for "another development" will become strong enough to permit any government to undertake aid on a scale seriously curtailing domestic levels of living; such an effort would probably be followed by the replacement of the government and a conservative-isolationist retreat.

The capacity of the two main Socialist styles to influence change in the Third World depends partly on the ideological appeal of the styles themselves and their demonstration of the possibility of "another development", as their reality is filtered through the consciousness of different sectors of opinion in the Third World; partly on the allegiance and strength of disciplined political forces identifying themselves with one style or the other; and partly on the ability and willingness of the two camps to offer material and technical aid (including military) to governments and movements in the Third World. In the first area, China now has some advantage; it offers a more accessible model to low-income predominantly rural societies and, as indicated above, different aspects of its experience can appeal to quite different groups. In the other two areas, the U.S.S.R. has the advantage, in view of the greater organizational cohesiveness and working-class base of the parties looking to it for guidance, in view of its greater

^{18/} The 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report on Development and International Co-operation proposes that international resource transfers should be concentrated on countries "whose efforts are or will be directed towards the priority goal of satisfying the needs of the majority poor and which are carrying out or will carry out the necessary structural transformations..." and stipulates that "countries which do not respect human rights should not benefit from financial transfers". (p. 18).

industrial and technological capacity, and to some extent in view of its greater capacity to offer a market for Third World exports. However, these last advantages are partially offset by the fact that potential beneficiaries expect more of the U.S.S.R. and associates as "rich" countries and may resent their refusal to recognize that they share with other "rich" countries a duty of resource transfer to the Third World.

In Latin America during the immediate future it is probable that, except in Cuba, influences from the two Socialist camps will remain secondary in importance compared with the multiple stimuli and constraints emanating from the non-Socialist industrialized countries. Soviet economic relations and technical co-operation will probably have an appreciable but deliberately restricted role in some countries; the irradiation of Soviet internal social trends, in the absence of unforeseeable changes in their present patterns, will be weak. The two facets of the Chinese experience will continue to edify different sectors of opinion, but their influence may well continue to be superficial. With present levels and patterns of urbanization, distribution of wealth and power, and economic-political-cultural dependency on the United States and Europe, it seems likely that aspirations to frugal and egalitarian development styles and to mass-participatory revolutions will continually reappear but just as continually wither in the incompatible environment.

The general features of Latin American semi-development - the frustrating contradiction between material capacity and governmentally declared determination to achieve styles of development affording all people of the region an adequate level of living and authentic participation in the decisions that affect their lives, on the one side; and real economic, cultural, and political adherence to styles that require concentrated income distribution and manipulation of the people, on the other - have been discussed in several ECLA studies with conceptual frameworks similar

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to the present paper, and need not be further elaborated on at this point.^{19/} Our next step will be to examine one central proposition of the concrete utopias - developmental priority to elimination of critical poverty - against this background.^{20/}

^{19/} See, in particular, Desarrollo Humano, Cambio Social y Crecimiento en América Latina (Cuadernos de la CEPAL N° 3, Santiago, 1975). The Bariloche Foundation's Latin American Model has confirmed the practicability, in terms of material and human resources, of the achievement of an adequate level of living by the whole regional population without external transfers.

^{20/} See "Poverty as a Social Phenomenon and as a Central Issue in Development Policy" (ECLA/DRAFT/DS/133), which constitutes Chapter III of the present work.

SUMMARY

Recent international normative declarations on development combine two kinds of propositions: (a) on a new international order of economic equality between nation states; (b) on a new order within countries giving priority to the meeting of basic human needs, collective self-reliance, and equality between human beings. The first propositions suppose that development in the future, although reformed and better planned, will take place within economic systems and respond to incentives similar to those prevailing up to the present. The second propositions suppose that development must come to mean something entirely different, requiring a transformation of values and human relationships within countries as well as between countries. The juxtaposition of the two kinds of propositions in the declarations responds to their character of concrete utopias devised by committees, in which spokesmen for different ideologies, disciplines, and types of national society seek common ground, and also to the present atmosphere of multifaceted crisis, in which faith in economic development is waning but retains a powerful appeal, while conviction of the need for radically different strategies is strongest among fragmented intellectual minorities. It can be expected that the second propositions will penetrate wider sectors of public opinion and increasingly influence what governments try to do, but that their confrontation with national and international realities will produce results rather different from the claims of their advocates.

Both sets of propositions suppose a high degree of capacity to act coherently in accordance with international norms on the part of governments in the First, Second, and Third Worlds. As the responsibilities formally assumed by the state continue to diversify, however, heterogeneous and mutually contradictory internal changes associated with partial disintegration of the previous social and economic orders stand in the way of such a capacity. These "seeds of change" differ in the industrialized market-economy

/countries, in

countries, in the industrialized Socialist countries, and in the different regions and types of countries of the Third World, but influences from each type of national society, largely outside the control of governments, penetrate and undergo mutations in the others. The levels and patterns of dependent semi-development reached by most Latin American national societies condition their responses to such influences and their capacity to transform their styles of development.

